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1. Introduction 
 
Financial markets are characterized by pronounced informational asymmetries. This is 
particularly true in times of market uncertainty, for example, following economic 
turbulences or in the wake of stock market launches (IPOs). In order that markets can 
perform their allocative function under this premise, market prices should reflect all 
available information. In other words, markets have to be informationally efficient. 
Assuming market participants to use all available public and private information, the 
transfer of information considerably influences allocative market efficiency (Leland and 
Pyle 1977). It is thus crucial to understand to what extent information is revealed 
through market prices. Ultimately, market prices should be consistent with rational 
expectations (as defined by Muth 1961) about future benefits and not be driven by 
informational “mirages”1, speculation or the lack of proper investment alternatives.  
With respect to these issues regarding informational asymmetries, the potential 
influence that insider trading exerts on market prices, unmonitored by financial market 
authorities, is of particular interest. Apart the fact that unrestricted insider trading is 
prohibited by law in all prominent financial markets, it likely takes place. Interestingly, 
Bris (2005), using acquisition data from 52 countries between 1990 and 2000, finds that 
the introduction of laws that prohibit insider trading increases the occurrence and 
profitability of insider trading. Jeng et al. (2003), using Center for Research in Securities 
Prices (CRSP) transactions data from 1975 to 1996, find further that insider purchases 
yield returns that are more than 6% above expected returns per year, while insider sales 
do not yield significant abnormal returns. In the ongoing debate between proponents 
and opponents of deregulation of insider trading in the economic and law literature, to 
date, neither efficiency nor fairness and equity arguments can mutually persuade the 
debating parties (Fishman and Hagerty 1992, Bainbridge 1998). 
In this paper, we study asset price formation in a new experimental setting involving 
multi-period assets in an environment with uncertainty about market fundamentals. 
Specifically, we consider the existence of two possible states of nature. We compare 
price formation in markets with and without informational asymmetry. In the latter 
markets, some of the traders do have information on the true state, while other traders 
don’t. We use the experimental-economics laboratory as a wind channel to study 
whether financial markets are informationally efficient and how informational 
asymmetries (due to insider information) impact market price formation. This would 
hardly be possible (if not impossible) to disentangle on real market grounds, due to the 
blurry nature of underlying securities’ values and the uncontrollable and incalculable 
information distribution among market participants in real-life markets. In the 
experiment we can control the information available to market participants and the 
                                                          
1 Camerer and Weigelt (1991) define mirages in the following way: “[I]n inferring information from the 
trades of others, traders sometimes err and their errors cause others to overreact, creating price paths 
that falsely reveal information that no one has.” (p. 489) 
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securities’ fundamentals. Although the expectation formation of market participants 
remains difficult to grasp,2 we can explicitly control the informational asymmetries 
between market participants, including the number of informed participants 
(henceforth also inside traders or insiders) relative to the uninformed (henceforth also 
outside traders or outsiders). We neither claim nor aim to resolve the debate between 
proponents and opponents of insider trading regulation, however, strive to fuel the 
discussion with the provision of additional experimental evidence. 
Since the seminal paper by Smith et al. (1988) (henceforth, SSW) countless studies have 
investigated common stock valuation in experimental asset markets with multi-period 
assets characterized by declining fundamental values (FVs). However, relatively few 
studies consider informational asymmetries. If (experimental) markets are efficient, the 
market value should equal the risk-adjusted present value of the rationally expected 
future financial benefits conditioned on all available information. Asset price changes 
should only occur when new information is brought into the market, which changes 
expectations about the income stream (Shiller 2003). Deviations from fundamentals, if 
at all, should be only temporary until the risk-adjusted expectations converge. Such kind 
of markets would approximate what Fama (1970), the originator of the efficient-market 
hypothesis (EMH), called “efficient”. However, SSW-type markets predominantly resist 
showing efficiency and persistently exhibit bubbles, which hardly can be explained by 
differences in preferences or risk aversion. The observed bubble-and-crash 
phenomenon is found to be strikingly robust to changes in the experimental 
environment.3 “Smart money”4 seems not as smart as desired by theory in view of the 
numerously observed experimental (and real-life) bubbles. The only factor that fairly 
reliably impairs this widely observed pattern is experience (in the sense of repetition). 
Dufwenberg et al. (2005) have shown that even a fraction of experienced subjects in an 
experimental market is sufficient to reduce the occurrence of bubbles. However, this 
seems to hold only if the market environment (initial endowments and dividend 
structure) remains unchanged during the trials (Hussam et al. 2008). 
On the basis of Dufwenberg et al. (2005), Sutter et al. (2012) hypothesize that, in 
addition to experience, an asymmetric distribution of information about an asset’s 
imminent future dividends among the participants might serve to reduce mispricing, i.e., 
the magnitude of bubbles. They argue that the core of this alleviating effect might lie in 
the common knowledge of the existence of better informed or experienced traders. 
                                                          
2 How the available information disseminates through the market and is processed by the individual 
traders to build individual expectations remains a tremendous source of uncertainty. It resembles Keynes 
(1936) view of the stock market as a “beauty contest” in which traders are more concerned about the 
beliefs of others than about their own valuation based upon all available information. As good as the 
experimenters can control for the market parameters, as bad they can control the endogenous beliefs of 
participants about other participants’ behavior (Noussair and Plott 2008). 
3 See, e.g., King et al. (1993), Porter and Smith (1994), or Palan (2009) for comprehensive and salient 
reviews of the experimental “bubble” literature. For an overview of bubble definitions see, e.g., Siegel 
(2003). 
4 “Smart money” theory as a branch of the efficient market hypothesis was considered to be able to keep 
prices tracking fundamentals (Shiller 2003). 
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Implementing a SSW framework, they find information asymmetries to significantly 
reduce the size of price bubbles, implying higher market efficiency. Moreover, they do 
not detect a significant difference in profits between traders with different information 
levels. However, in an earlier study, King (1991) finds no evidence for asymmetric 
distribution of information to eliminate price bubbles in a SSW environment. In his 
study informed traders, likewise, could not capitalize their informational advantage 
through higher profits; they were just able to recoup the costs for the acquisition of the 
private information.5 
Another experimental literature strand studies asymmetric information using an 
approach different from SSW. It is based on one-period Arrow-Debreu assets with state-
contingent and trader-type dependent dividends, and in the cases where insider 
information is investigated, asymmetric distributions of state information (e.g., 
(Forsythe et al. 1982, Plott and Sunder 1982, Forsythe et al. 1984, Ang and Schwarz 
1985, Plott and Sunder 1988, Camerer and Weigelt 1991, Sunder 1992, Friedman 1993, 
Ackert et al. 1997, Ackert and Church 1998). The studies in this literature strand focus 
on the test of the “prior information equilibrium pricing prediction model” (PI) versus 
the “fully revealing rational-expectations equilibrium prediction model” (RE). Both 
prediction models will be explained in more detail in Section 3 below. In summary, this 
literature strand shows that markets are generally able to aggregate information quite 
successfully. PI predictions seem to be a good benchmark for trades in early periods, 
whereas the RE predictions appear more accurate in later periods. Plott and Sunder 
(1988), for example, argue as follows: “Rational expectations can be seen either as a 
static theory of markets (e.g., as in the efficient market literature in finance) or as an 
end-point of a dynamic path of adjustment.” (p. 1104) 
Our experiment is novel in that it combines both literature strands and introduces state-
dependence in the SSW framework. In our new framework, insider information is 
defined as the knowledge of the state. The aim of our study is to analyze how 
informational aspects, including the existence of inside knowledge, influence price 
formation and market performance. 
In our experiment, the dividend paid by an asset, in each of 15 periods, has four possible 
values and is the same for all traders. However, in each period, the dividend is stochastic 
and its distribution function depends upon one of two possible states of the world. In 
other words, the state determines the probabilities with which the respective dividends 
are drawn. The “state of the world” is determined at the beginning of the experiment 
and stays the same over all periods. Traders generally do not know the state but are 
informed that the probability of each state is 50 percent. This is the prior belief, which 
determines the ex-ante expected fundamental value of the assets. Based on the observed 
dividends during the experiment, this belief can be updated according to the method of 
Bayes, resulting in ex-post expected fundamental values (BFVs) of the assets. In some of 
                                                          
5 Unlike the work of Sutter et al. (2012), which uses randomly assigned and free private information, King 
(1991) investigates costly private information that is auctioned off before the markets start. 
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the experimental markets informational asymmetry is established via a random 
assignment of cost-free information about the state to some inside traders. 
We investigate how information is processed and disseminated trough market prices. 
We are particularly interested in two informational aspects: (1) the role of traders who 
are informed about the true state (insiders), and/or (2) the impact of the provision of 
Bayesian updates of the assets’ state-dependent fundamental value to all traders. We 
compare the outcomes in markets where two traders with insider information about the 
actual “state of the world” are present (and the presence is common knowledge) to the 
outcomes in markets without any insider information. Additionally, in half of the 
markets with insiders and half of the markets without insiders, we provide all traders in 
every period with updated BFVs. In all four resulting treatments, to scrutinize traders’ 
ability to anticipate uncertain future outcomes, a key issue in financial markets, we elicit 
traders’ expectations about the future market prices at the beginning of each period and 
provide monetary incentives for the accuracy of their predictions. 
Our main results are the following: We find bubbles to occur rarely in all treatments, 
even though all traders are inexperienced, i.e., never participated in market experiments 
before. Markets with asymmetrically informed traders exhibit smaller price deviations 
from fundamentals, suggesting higher market efficiency. The provision of BFVs has little 
to no effect. Behavior of in- and outsiders differs in early periods but converges over the 
course of the markets. On average, we find outsider limit buy/sell prices to be lower 
(higher) in the “good” (“bad”) state and outsiders to hold less (more) assets in “good”-
state (“bad”-state) markets compared to insiders. Insiders manage to exploit their 
superior position and are able to earn higher profits. With regard to price expectations, 
we find forecasts and actual market prices to be highly correlated. Forecast precision, 
however, seems to be impeded by the presence of insiders, while the provision of BFVs 
seems to have no impact on forecast quality. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the 
experimental market design and describes the experimental procedures. Section 3 
introduces two behavioral models and provides testable hypotheses. Section 4 reviews 
these hypotheses in the face of the results of the experimental markets. Section 5 gives a 
summary and concludes.  
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2. Laboratory Markets and Experimental Procedures 
 
We conducted the computerized experiment in the Göttingen Laboratory of Behavioral 
Economics at the University of Göttingen, Germany, based on the z-tree software 
package (Fischbacher 2007). 
A total of 192 subjects participated in 32 markets with six traders, each. Participants 
were student volunteers recruited for a decision-making experiment via ORSEE (Greiner 
2004). All participants were Bachelor or Master Students in business administration or 
international economics at the University of Göttingen and thus had some background in 
economics. 
Each subject assumed the role of a trader in an asset market. Six participants 
(henceforth traders) participated in a market lasting 15 periods. Each experiment 
session involved two or three independent markets. At no time, traders did know the 
identity of other traders in the market. A market lasted 15 periods and involved trading 
in call auctions (for buying and selling) in each period. 
The experimental sessions were conducted in two parts. In the first part, risk 
preferences were elicited using lottery choices following Holt and Laury (2002) (see 
Appendix A for more details). Trading in the call-auction market took place in the 
second part. For both parts traders were given detailed written instructions. For the first 
part, written instructions were individually provided. For the second part, instructions 
were read aloud in a briefing room and supplemented by a presentation of screenshots 
which included all screens traders encountered during the experiment. Instructions and 
screenshots of the program are provided in the Appendix C. The whole process before 
the call-auction market started lasted on average about 45 minutes. During the entire 
session traders were not allowed to talk to each other. 
 
2.1. Characteristics Common to All Sessions 
 
At the beginning of each experimental market each trader is endowed with 10 assets 
and 10,000 ECU working capital. We have chosen to provide the same endowment to all 
traders to prevent trading merely due to the desire to realign portfolios. King et al. 
(1993) found no significant effect of equal endowments on bubble formation. Each 
trader’s initial endowment in ECU is large enough to buy at least a quarter of the other 
traders’ assets in a market at initial fundamental values. Short selling is not permitted. 
The initial working capital has to be repaid at the end of the market session. Traders’ 
asset and working capital holdings are carried over from one period to the next. 
Prior to the trading stage, at the beginning of each period, traders have to state their 
expectations about the prospective market prices of the present and all subsequent 
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trading periods. Thus, each trader has to state in each period 𝑡 ∈ (1, … , 15) a total of 
(16 − 𝑡) forecasts. To create an incentive for participants to care about forecast 
precision, participants are rewarded (in ECU) for the accuracy of each forecast.6 If the 
forecasted price is within a 10 percent, 10-20 percent or 20-30 percent range, a 
respective reward of 5 ECU, 2 ECU or 1 ECU is paid. For less accurate forecasts no 
reward is paid. Over the course of the 15 market periods, for any period 𝑡 (1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 15) 𝑡 
predictions are requested and thus a reward may be obtained up to 𝑡 times. In each 
period, after all traders have stated their predictions, trading commenced in a call-
auction market. 
Each of the 15 market periods on average lasted five minutes (including forecasts). In 
each period, assets with an initial lifetime of 15 periods can be traded. Each asset pays 
the same dividend to all its holders in a market. The dividend is randomly drawn after 
the trading at the end of each period. It can take a value of 10 ECU, 20 ECU 40 ECU, or 80 
ECU. The fundamental value of an asset is determined by the dividend stream that it 
generates to its holder. It corresponds to the sum of all expected future dividends. 
Consequently, the fundamental value declines to zero in the course of a market. After the 
final payment of the dividend in the last period, the asset becomes worthless. 
Since our research focus lies in the propensity of markets to aggregate and disseminate 
information, we incorporate state-dependency of assets, as in Camerer and Weigelt 
(1991). Like in the SSW type markets, the dividend from holding an asset does not differ 
across traders. That means that markets have only one “type” of trader with regard to 
dividend value. However, the expected dividend depends upon the “state of the world”, 
which is randomly drawn at the beginning of a market. There are two equally likely 
states. State 1 is called the “good” and State 2 the “bad” state. The set of possible 
dividend values is equal in both states of the world but dividend values occur with 
different probabilities. We have chosen probability distributions of the dividends in 
order to focus the subjects’ attention on the two different expected values for the “good” 
and “bad” state and to determine two clearly distinguishable states of the world. Actual 
dividends originate from independent random draws out of the set {10, 20, 40, 80} of 
possible dividends. The expected dividend per period in a given state is given by the 
probability weighted sum of the possible dividends. Table 1 provides the possible per 
period dividend values and the corresponding probabilities of occurrence under each of 
the two states. It also provides the expected per period dividend 𝐸𝐷𝑆  in each state 𝑆 ∈
(1, 2). 
  
                                                          
6 We use incentivized belief elicitation because it can be expected that participants exert more effort to 
forecast correctly and that these forecasts are more accurate than non-incentivized, as was, for example, 
found by Gächter and Renner (2010). 
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Table 1: Possible Dividend Values and Probabilities 
Possible  
Dividends 
Probability in 
“Good” State (𝑆 = 1) 
Probability in 
“Bad” State (𝑆 = 2) 
10 0.1 0.4 
20 0.2 0.3 
40 0.3 0.2 
80 0.4 0.1 
𝐸𝐷𝑆   49 26 
 
In the “good” state the probabilities of the higher dividends are larger than in the “bad” 
state, resulting in a higher expected dividend value per period and a higher FV in each 
period. The expected dividend per period is 49 in the “good” state and 26 in the “bad'” 
state. In the first period, with no information about the state at hand the expected 
dividend is 37.5. This value changes after each period’s dividend draw according to 
Bayes' theorem, since the updated probability to be in one state or the other also 
changes according to this rule. For a given “state of the world”, the FV is given by the 
product of the expected dividend per period and the number of remaining periods the 
dividend is paid. Formally, the FV in State 𝑆 and period 𝑡 is given by (16 − 𝑡)𝐸𝐷𝑆, 
assuming no discounting. 
FVs in both states reduce after each period by the expected dividend per period. Given 
the ex-ante probabilities for the states and actual dividend draws Bayesian inference is 
possible due to the different drawing probabilities of the dividends in both states. The 
Bayesian fundamental value (BFV) in a given period is the probability-weighted mean of 
the FVs in the “good” and “bad” state in the respective period. The weights are given by 
the conditional probabilities based on Bayesian inference. The probabilities of dividends 
in both states of the world, the probabilities for both states, and the fundamental values 
in both states are provided to all traders in the (read-aloud) experiment instructions 
and are thus considered as common knowledge. 
To have control over the drawn dividends and to render markets comparable, we follow 
the approach of Sutter et al. (2012). We randomly draw a sequence of 15 realizations of 
the dividend (one for every period) with the respective probabilities in the “good” state 
and “mirror” this sequence for the realizations of the dividends in the “bad” state. This is 
easily feasible due to the symmetric framework. We consciously choose a sequence that 
does not “fully” reveal the underlying state from the start. The resulting two sequences, 
one for each state, are used during all markets. 
In the experiment we have chosen the states in such a way that one half of the markets 
were in the “good” state and the other half in the “bad” state. Table 2 provides, for each 
state, the sequence of the asset’s actual dividend draws (Ds), the actual FVs (AFVs) and 
the (depending on the dividend draws) updated Bayesian FVs (BFVs). The last column of 
this table provides the conditional probabilities of the actually prevailing state.   
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Table 2: Sequence of Dividend Draws and Corresponding Fundamentals in the 
“Good” and “Bad” State 
Period 
“Good” State “Bad” State Cond. Prob. 
for the State FV D AFV BFV FV D AFV BFV 
1 735 40 720 563 390 20 420 563 0.50 
2 686 80 680 557 364 10 400 493 0.60 
3 637 20 600 594 338 40 390 381 0.86 
4 588 10 580 533 312 80 350 367 0.80 
5 539 80 570 413 286 10 270 413 0.50 
6 490 80 490 444 260 10 260 306 0.80 
7 441 20 410 429 234 40 250 246 0.94 
8 392 40 390 376 208 20 210 224 0.91 
9 343 80 350 334 182 10 190 191 0.94 
10 294 10 270 292 158 80 180 158 0.98 
11 245 40 260 238 130 20 100 137 0.94 
12 196 20 220 192 104 40 80 108 0.96 
13 147 80 200 143 78 10 40 82 0.94 
14 98 40 120 97 52 20 30 53 0.98 
15 49 80 80 49 26 10 10 26 0.99 
Notes: FV = Fundamental Values, D = Dividends, AFV = Actual Fundamental Values, BFV = Bayesian 
Fundamental Values. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the dividends at the beginning correctly suggest the 
underlying state, then by period 5 reset state probabilities to 50:50, and subsequently 
again correctly suggest the underlying state. Toward the end, dividends reveal the state 
with almost certainty. This characteristic of the dividend stream has the desirable 
property to introduce initial uncertainty regarding the real state as it is surely 
frequently present on real markets. 
Trading in the call market in each period lasts a maximum of 240 seconds. During the 
first 120 seconds traders have the opportunity to submit a purchase offer; in the second 
120 seconds they have the opportunity to submit a sale offer. Each trader may 
determine one buy and one sell limit order per period to buy/sell a certain number of 
assets. A buy (sell) order consists of the maximum (minimum) price which a trader 
wants to pay (is willing to accept) per asset and the maximum number of assets the 
trader is willing to buy (sell) at that price. Traders are not obliged to submit buy and/or 
sell orders. In the case of a “zero order” no assets are bought and/or sold at any market 
price; traders just keep their stock of assets. At no point of time, traders get to know the 
offers of others. 
All bids and asks within a period are submitted simultaneously and are aggregated into 
market demand and supply. The call market features a market-clearing condition such 
that demand equals supply in each trading period. Markets are cleared at unitary prices 
for all transactions within each period so that the trading volumes are maximized.7 
                                                          
7 The call market institution has the advantage that it yields for each trader a unique trading price per 
period for all buy and sell orders. Furthermore, Liu (1992) found that call markets are more efficient than 
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Transactions only take place as long as there are dealers who want to sell at a lower or 
the same price than other dealers are willing to pay. The market price is determined by 
the average of the lowest limit buy price and the highest limit sale price for which a 
transaction takes place. No trader has to pay more for an asset than he/she offered and 
no trader has to sell for less than he/she asked. If the aggregated market price lies above 
the chosen sale price the trader is a seller and if the market price lies below the chosen 
buy price the trader is a buyer. If, depending on the submitted buy and sell orders, no 
transactions can take place, there is no market price. In this case we referred to the 
market price as zero. 
Ties on the demand and/or selling side are handled using an order precedence rule 
consisting of the price, quantity and entering time. On the buy (sell) side higher (lower) 
buy (sell) prices, higher quantities, and an earlier submission time are favored.8 Traders 
are instructed that they might not get all or part of their buy/sell order fulfilled even if 
they hand in an adequate price. 
During the choice of buy and sell offers, traders have to make sure that these are 
permissible. Firstly, they can never sell more assets than they have at the beginning of 
the period in their own portfolio. Secondly, never buy more assets as permitted by the 
available sum of asset holdings of the other traders in their group. Thirdly, never buy 
more assets at a certain price than permitted by the available trading capital. Fourthly, 
the limit sell order price must exceed the limit buy order price by at least one ECU. 
At the end of the trading state in each period all possible individual transactions are 
completed, the drawn dividend is announced, and the updated account of asset and 
trading capital holdings along with the dividend earnings for the current period are 
presented to the traders. Additionally the results for the accuracy of price forecasts 
along with the associated earnings are given for the current period. Furthermore, 
traders are provided with a complete history of relevant information concerning their 
portfolio (asset and cash holdings etc.) during both phases of the trading stage in each 
period. 
The payout relevant profit (in ECU) to a subject is determined by the available trading 
capital at the end of the 15th period minus the initial trading capital. It can be 
alternatively calculated as the sum of the period profits: 
Period profit = Number of assets at end of the period × dividend per asset  
+ Proceeds from sold assets 
(1) – Expenses for purchased assets 
+ Remuneration of market-price forecast(s) 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
continuous double auction markets in settings were uninformed traders are present jointly with diversely 
informed insiders (Sunder 1995). 
8 Index = 100 ⋅ RpD,S + 10RqD,S + E, where RpD,S  is the price rank, decreasing with ascending (descending) 
buy (sell) price; RqD,S  is the quantity rank, decreasing in the buy (sell) quantity; and E is the entering order 
number. Lower rank numbers are favored and a lower index corresponds to a preferred offer. 
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Following the method of induced value theory, we expect traders to exhibit a positive 
utility for money, i.e., to maximize their earnings. Demand for (Supply of) asset is hence 
induced by a preference for (higher) earnings (Smith 1976). 
All trading in the experiment was in terms of Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 
Earnings were converted into Euros at the end of the market, at a known rate of 
0.003 €/ECU). Additionally, each trader was paid a show-up fee of 3 €. A session lasted 
on average about 2.5 hours. Traders’ earnings averaged about 25 €. 
 
2.2. Treatments 
 
We conducted our experiment by using a 2 × 2 design. Firstly, the information structure 
of markets differed across sessions, i.e., the structure of informed and uninformed 
traders with respect to the true state of nature differed across markets. In the so called 
Nin(B)9 sessions no participant was given a clue about the true state of nature and it was 
announced that no trader received information about the state. In the so called Tin(B) 
sessions two participants in a market are provided on the computer screen with 
information about the underlying “state of the world” at the beginning of the market. In 
these sessions it was publicly announced (common knowledge) that there will be two 
randomly chosen informed traders in each market and that their identity will remain 
secret to all other participants. The information given to the informed participants was 
identical and perfect in the sense that it would reveal the state of nature with certainty 
(this was also common knowledge). By virtue of the design of the markets, insiders and 
outsiders were the same traders throughout the entire markets. Secondly, we 
distinguish between sessions where participants were or were not provided with 
updated conditional probabilities for both states and the corresponding BFVs. The (B) 
after Nin and Tin indicates that in these markets all traders were provided with updated 
BFVs in each period. 
Table 3 displays a summary of the design parameters of each of our 32 asset markets. 
Specifically, it gives an overview over the underlying state, the provision of BFVs, and 
the presence of insiders in each market. 
 
  
                                                          
9 When markets with or without insider information are considered together, regardless of the provision 
of BFVs, we refer to them simply as Tin(B) and Nin(B) markets. 
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Table 3: Markets and Information Levels 
Treatment 
No. 
Label State 
State 
Label 
BFVs 
Insiders  
(#) 
Market  
No. 
1 Nin 
Good Nin+ 
No No 
17, 19, 21, 23 
Bad Nin- 18, 20, 22, 24 
2 NinB 
Good NinB+ 
Yes No 
1, 3, 5, 7 
Bad NinB- 2, 4, 6, 8 
3 Tin 
Good Tin+ 
No Two 
25, 27, 29, 31 
Bad Tin- 26, 28, 30, 32 
4 TinB 
Good TinB+ 
Yes Two 
9, 11, 13, 15 
Bad TinB- 10, 12, 14, 16 
Note: Markets are numbered in the order how the observations were collected during the experimental 
sessions. 
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3. Informational Models and Hypotheses 
 
3.1. Informational Models 
 
Following the studies of, for example, Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988) or Camerer and 
Weigelt (1991), we test two different models: the prior information equilibrium (PI) 
model and the fully revealing rational-expectations equilibrium (RE) model. Both 
models assume traders to be risk-neutral and give different forecasts about trading 
behavior of differently informed traders. These models can be formalized quantitatively 
and tested against each other.10 
The PI-model states that traders do not learn from price signals and only use their prior 
information to determine the state. They ignore the informational content of market 
prices (as the aggregated information of others) and speculation possibilities depending 
on the actions of other traders (Palan 2009). Traders only use Bayes' rule to update their 
expectations about the true state. 
The RE-model additionally states that in equilibrium all traders behave as if they are 
aware of the entire information of all traders in the market. Thus even uninformed 
traders have the ability to supplement their prior (“private”) information with private 
information of others via price signals from the market that entail (perfect) information 
of insiders.11 They are aware of the relationship between the market price, the 
underlying state, and their gains from trade and utilize the market price and their 
“private” information in their demand decision (Tirole 1982). 
In our experiment we chose dividends, prior probabilities of dividends, and states in a 
manner that fundamentals and hence predictions of the PI- and RE-models clearly differ 
in both states. Table 4 shows the expected FVs per asset with respect to information, 
state, and informational model. When there is no inside information in the market, the 
PI- and the RE-model both predict no trade in both states. According to both theories, all 
traders have the same expectations about the respective FVs, which equal the updated 
BFVs. There are no evident gains from and thus no incentives to trade. 
When insider information is present, both theories predict that trade will take place 
since in- and outsiders have different expectations about fundamentals. For the RE-
model this is true only for the first period. Assuming in- and outsiders are strict payoff 
maximizers and place bid prices marginally below and ask prices marginally above their 
expected FVs, the market price will approximately average the expected FVs.  
                                                          
10 We refrain from testing intermediate dynamic models like that of Jordan (1982). These models aren't 
easy to handle and don't give precise predictions of expected values and therefore prices. Though some 
works showed that trading in experimental asset markets does seem to follow a kind of “Jordan path” 
(Plott and Sunder 1982). 
11 The RE-model has a close connection to the efficient markets hypothesis. Bid/ask prices reflect diverse 
private information and thus induce trading actions identical to those if all traders had all market 
information (Harrison and Kreps 1978). 
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Table 4: Expected FVs under PI and RE by Information and State 
 No Information Inside Information 
 “Good” “Bad” “Good” “Bad” 
Period PI = RE PI = RE PI RE PI RE 
1 563 563 
735 
[563] 
735 
[563] 
390 
[563] 
390 
[563] 
2 557 493 
686 
[557] 
686 
[686] 
364 
[493] 
364 
[364] 
3 594 381 
637 
[594] 
637 
[637] 
338 
[381] 
338 
[388] 
4 533 367 
588 
[533] 
588 
[588] 
312 
[367] 
312 
[312] 
5 413 413 
539 
[413] 
539 
[539] 
286 
[413] 
286 
[286] 
6 444 306 
490 
[444] 
490 
[490] 
260 
[306] 
260 
[260] 
7 429 246 
441 
[429] 
441 
[441] 
234 
[246] 
234 
[234] 
8 376 224 
392 
[376] 
392 
[392] 
208 
[224] 
208 
[208] 
9 334 191 
343 
[334] 
343 
[343] 
182 
[191] 
182 
[182] 
10 292 158 
294 
[292] 
294 
[294] 
156 
[158] 
156 
[156] 
11 238 137 
245 
[238] 
245 
[245] 
130 
[137] 
130 
[130] 
12 192 108 
196 
[192] 
196 
[196] 
104 
[108] 
104 
[104] 
13 143 82 
147 
[143] 
147 
[147] 
78 
[82] 
78 
[48] 
14 97 53 
98 
[97] 
98 
[98] 
52 
[53] 
52 
[52] 
15 49 26 
49 
[49] 
49 
[49] 
26 
[26] 
26 
[26] 
Notes: Figures show for the case of insider information the known FVs for informed and expected FVs for 
[uninformed] traders. The bold figures identify the convergence period as defined in Section 4.1. 
 
Since in the first period the resulting market price is higher (lower) than the BFV of 563 
in the “good” (“bad”) state, outsiders supplement their prior information with this price 
signal and are able to infer the correct state under the RE-model assumptions. Informed 
traders can thus only take advantage of their superior position in the first period. On the 
other hand, under the PI-model trade may virtually take place throughout all periods, 
assuming availability of assets on the supply side. Since market participants ignore the 
informational content of market prices, expectations about fundamentals only converge 
slowly to the true value, which leads to a more persistent superior position of insiders. 
According to both models, bid and ask behavior will result in asset allocations where 
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insiders hold more (less) assets in the “good” (“bad”) state than outsiders. This is 
especially true under the PI-model. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
 
To facilitate the illustration of the results in the following section our analysis focuses 
around six hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Trading prices converge toward the actual FV under all treatment 
conditions, but the convergence is faster in markets with insider information and markets 
where traders are provided with BFVs. 
In our markets, convergence toward fundamentals depends substantially on the 
accuracy of the probability assessment. This is a complex task, especially in an 
experimental situation, where time is limited. Markets aggregate information. However, 
it will take time for prices to track the FV.12 Following Romer (1993), the dissemination 
of privately held information and/or expectations is likely to cause lagged price 
movements. Proponents of the “efficiency camp” of insider trading argue that 
convergence of market prices toward fundamentals is faster when inside information is 
present (Manne 1984, Engelen and Liedekerke 2007, McGee 2008). Sutter et al. (2012) 
and Dufwenberg et al. (2005) provide experimental evidence that markets where some 
traders have an informational/experiential edge above others show a significantly 
better performance in terms of market efficiency. Since people are unlikely to carry out 
Bayesian inference by themselves (Kahneman and Tversky 1972, Camerer 1999, Rabin 
and Schrag 1999), we expect markets where traders are provided with BFVs to converge 
faster toward fundamentals than markets that are not. 
Hypothesis 2: Bubbles occur, but the introduction of asymmetrically informed traders, or 
the provision with BFVs significantly reduces the occurrence and extent of bubbles. 
A vast literature shows that the bubble-and-crash phenomenon is strikingly robust in 
SSW markets (see footnote 3). Since the introduction of insider information is expected 
to enhance market performance in terms of the duration of equilibrium adjustment of 
market prices, we expect markets with asymmetrically informed traders to be less prone 
to bubble formation than markets with symmetrically informed traders, a result also 
observed by Sutter et al. (2012) and Dufwenberg et al. (2005). Similarly, given that 
markets that are provided with BFVs are expected to converge faster toward 
fundamentals than markets that are not, we also expect them to exhibit smaller bubbles. 
                                                          
12 Forsythe et al. (1984) argue that “investors bring only their private information to the market and only 
after traders have observed prices will they learn the information necessary to achieve the [fully revealing 
rational-expectations equilibrium].” (p. 973) 
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Hypothesis 3: In early periods, trading behavior of uninformed traders differs from that 
of informed traders but converges along with the market price toward that of informed 
traders. Uninformed traders learn to grasp the correct state and to trade accordingly. 
Informed traders condition their trading behavior on private information and 
uninformed traders adapt their trading behavior based on the belief that informed 
traders only trade if it is advantageous for them to do so (King 1991), thereby revealing 
gradually the underlying state. In a fully revealing RE all private information held by 
informed traders is (sooner or later) revealed via the market price (King 1991). To the 
same extent as information is revealed, we expect that an adaptation of the trading 
behavior of in- and outsiders takes place. 
Hypothesis 4: In the “good” state, we expect insiders to hold more assets than outsiders, 
and in the “bad” state, outsiders to hold more assets than insiders. 
Given the different information structures of in- and outsiders, we expect the two types 
to show a significantly different buying and selling behavior. In Table 4 above we 
calculate the FV expectations of in- and outsiders. Based on these calculations we derive 
that insiders buy/hold more assets in the “good” state and outsiders in the “bad” state, 
under both the PI- and RE-assumption. The predicted asymmetric asset distribution 
should at least hold true in earlier periods, since we expect outsiders to learn in the 
course of the market. 
Hypothesis 5: Informed traders have a trading advantage and earn superior profits. 
Given that, especially in the beginning of the markets, insiders are able to buy and sell 
their assets for advantageous prices they should benefit from their superior 
informational position. 
Hypothesis 6: Elicited price expectations and actual market prices are highly correlated. 
Thereby, we expect predictive power to be greater in markets with inside information, and 
in markets where traders are provided with BFVs. 
There is a certain circularity in the market-price development process since current 
prices depend on expectations about future prices; but both are simultaneously 
influenced by current price levels and trends (Ball and Charles A. Holt 1998). Self-
fulfilling price expectations can render observed market prices independent of the 
asset's fundamentals, leading to bubbles, in which even rational traders get involved in 
the expectation of even “greater fools”.13 Expectations should therefore provide crucial 
information about the market price development.  
                                                          
13 Such bubbles are referred to as “rational growing bubbles” (Camerer 1989) or simply “rational bubbles” 
(Diba and Grossman 1988a, 1988b). They “reflect a self-confirming belief that the stock price depends on 
a variable (or a combination of variables) that is intrinsically irrelevant” (Diba and Grossman 1988a, p. 
520). Porter and Smith (1995) however find that “subjects report a tendency to think that if the market 
turns [when the bubble bursts] they will be able to sell ahead of the others, but then are “amazed” at the 
speed with which the crash occurs.” (p. 513) 
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4. Experimental Results 
 
4.1. Equilibrium Adjustment of Prices 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the main findings of our experiment by showing the course of the 
average equilibrium market prices in our four treatments. Each curve in the four graphs 
represents four markets under equal conditions with respect to state, insider 
information, and the provision of BFVs. All four graphs show the tendency of 
convergence toward the correct state. Most intriguing, the ubiquitous tendency of 
earlier laboratory asset markets with well-defined declining fundamental value and 
inexperienced traders to exhibit a well-known bubble-and-crash pattern is not observed 
in this aggregated examination, independent of the provided information structure. 
Strikingly, trade in both states starts, regardless of the presence of insiders and/or the 
provision of BFVs, on aggregate closer to fundamentals in the “bad” state, indicating risk 
aversion for the average trader.14 Indeed, we find slight risk aversion for the average 
trader in our risk pretests and in the personal assessment of one’s own attitude toward 
risk in the ex-post questionnaire (see Appendix A, Table A. 1 to Table A. 4). Given that 
average risk attitudes are very similar in all markets, we cannot find a significantly 
negative Spearman correlation between the average risk-aversion measure in a market 
and the 1st period market price.15 However, when counting the number of risk-averse 
(not risk-neutral, or risk-loving) traders per market, we find a slightly significant 
Spearman correlation for Risk-Test 1 following Holt and Laury (2002) (𝜌 = -.3049, p-
value = .0897, N = 32). Despite the substantial initial deviations from fundamentals 
(especially in the “good” state), we observe a clear tendency of convergence of aggregate 
market prices toward fundamentals of the actually underlying state around the fifth 
period. Intuitively, convergence starts in either state somewhere between the two 
fundamentals. This implies that we should observe convergence from below in the 
“good” state and convergence from above in the “bad” state. In the following we explore 
Hypothesis 1. 
While markets on aggregate show a clear convergence pattern, individual markets show 
substantial diversity. Some markets perform much better than others in terms of 
convergence toward the FV of the underlying state. Ten out of 32 observed markets even 
never converge to it.16 We consider market prices as “converged” if they approach the 
respective FV as close as ±20% and stay in this range until the end of the market or no 
more trading takes place. For the very last periods, our definition of convergence 
                                                          
14 Since dividend draws can be considered as lotteries, trading prices below (above) fundamentals 
indicate risk aversion (loving) of the average market participant. Hence, the ratio of the realized price and 
the fundamental value can serve as a proxy for average risk attitude in a market (Chen et al. 2004). 
15 The algebraic signs point in the intuitive direction that higher risk aversion in a market leads to a lower 
starting price. Only for “Risk-Test 2b” the sign is counterintuitive. 
16 Markets 4, 6, 9, 10, 15, 21, 26, 28, 30, 32 never converged toward the FV of the actual underlying state 
using the applied convergence measure. 
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requires at least two consecutive periods without trading, when market prices 
previously have deviated out of the range.17 Figure 2 shows the course of individual 
market prices for all markets in the four treatments. As seen, market prices initially 
fluctuate more erratically, but converge in most cases, sooner or later, toward the 
genuine state. Table 5 presents the average convergence period by treatment and the 
individual market convergence periods for the markets that have converged. 
To test for general convergence, we count for each treatment the number of markets 
that have converged. Applying one-sided binomial tests to the number of converged 
versus the number of non-converged markets, we find a significant tendency of 
convergence only for Nin, where seven out of eight markets converge (p-value = .0039). 
The hypothesis of general convergence is neither confirmed for NinB nor for Tin or TinB 
markets, when analyzed separately. 
When pooling the Nin and NinB markets, we observe 13 of 16 markets to converge, 
which yields statistical significance for general convergence (p-value = .0106, one-sided 
binomial test). Pooling Tin and TinB markets, we observe only 9 out of 16 markets to 
converge, implying no statistical significance. This indicates that the presence of insiders 
does not enhance but rather defer market convergence. On the other hand, confidence 
intervals for the absolute deviations from fundamentals are for the majority of periods 
narrower for Tin(B) than for Nin(B) markets. Although not statistically significant, this 
suggests that the above result lack of convergence in Tin(B) markets is driven by the 
small number of independent markets. 
Result 1: Using our simple counting measure, we only observe a general convergence 
toward fundamentals in Nin(B) markets. Our test for general convergence indicates that 
the presence of insiders defers convergence. This result, however, might be an artifact 
produced by the relatively small sample size. The provision of 𝐵𝐹𝑉𝑠 has no effect on 
convergence. 
  
                                                          
17 This “rule” has been relaxed/adjusted in some markets, where the measure in the last five periods 
trespassed the range in only one period, but was adhered to before, so that the assumption of convergence 
seems prudent. This “correction” has the aim to obtain a more “organic” and adequate measure of 
convergence. When no trading occurs, no pair of traders is willing to trade away from fundamentals, 
indicating that all traders are aware of the actual FV and that it is common knowledge (as defined by 
Aumann 1976). There is no opportunity to “fool” another trader. 
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Figure 1: Average Market Prices 
 
 
The trajectory of average market prices exhibits clear differences in comparison to most 
of earlier experiments using the SSW framework. Even in Nin markets the price course 
resembles that of markets with experienced traders or markets with a composition of 
traders with mixed information or experience levels (see, for example, Dufwenberg et al. 
2005, Haruvy et al. 2007, Hussam et al. 2008, Sutter et al. 2012). Additionally, 
convergence, as we have defined it, occurs on average later than predicted by the PI- and 
RE-models,18 except for NinB+ and Tin-. We thus conclude that neither the PI- nor the 
RE-model provide indeed good approximations of asset markets in our symmetric and 
asymmetric information settings. This finding stands in contrast to the previously 
mentioned literature on markets involving one-period assets and asymmetric 
information. 
  
                                                          
18 Both, the PI- and RE-models, predict convergence to occur (as we define it) in the sixth period in both 
states, when no insiders are present. The PI-model predicts convergence in the first and in the sixth period 
and the RE-model predicts convergence in the first and in the second period, in the “good” and “bad” state, 
respectively, when insiders are present. 
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Figure 2: Individual Market Prices  
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Table 5: Average Convergence Period 
State 
Label 
Average Period of 
Convergence 
Individual Markets 
Convergence Periods 
Market 
No. 
NinB+ 5.3 3, 2, 2, 14 1, 3, 5, 7 
NinB- 10.0 10, --, --, 10 2, 4, 6, 8 
TinB+ 11.0 --, 14, 8,-- 9, 11, 13, 15 
TinB- 6.0 --, 6, 9, 3 10, 12, 14, 16 
Nin+ 13.3 11, 15, --, 14 17, 19, 21, 23 
Nin- 9.5 9, 6, 14, 9 18, 20, 22, 24 
Tin+ 7.3 11, 3, 13, 2 25, 27, 29, 31 
Tin- -- --, --, --, -- 26, 28, 30, 32 
Notes:  Markets that did not converge are denoted by “--“. Averages are computed using converged 
markets only. 
 
 
4.2. Over- and Undervaluation of Market Prices 
 
This chapter focuses on Hypothesis 2. As mentioned earlier, bubbles didn’t occur in 
aggregated form. However, some markets exhibited patterns that, though smaller than 
in many previous experiments, can be considered as price bubbles. In the following, we 
define a price bubble as a deviation of market prices from fundamentals by more than 
30% in at least two consecutive periods. Since markets firstly must somehow fathom the 
actually underlying state, we consider, however, only deviations after the fifth period, in 
the “bad” state. Otherwise, in the “bad” state, market prices in the first periods would 
often misleadingly signal bubbles, when in fact just the “natural” adaption process takes 
place. Given our definition of market convergence, a bubble can evidently only occur 
before a market converges. 
Using our definition of bubbles, we find four markets (10, 22, 23, and 29) to exhibit a 
bubble pattern. Market 9, the market with the, at the first glimpse, ostensibly most 
obvious deviation pattern, exceeds fundamentals in the 4th period by “only” 27%, and is 
thus not considered to exhibit a bubble pattern. Table 6 gives an overview of markets 
that exhibit bubble patterns, the duration of the bubble and the convergence period. The 
occurrence of bubbles seems to have no relation to the presence of insiders, the 
provision of BFVs, or the underlying state. 
To additionally gauge the severity of market-price deviations from fundamentals, i.e., 
differences in market performance, also when markets don’t exhibit bubble patterns, we 
employ two deviation measures,19 both developed by Stöckl et al. (2010).  
                                                          
19 Given the high correlation of these deviation measures with other calculated “bubble” measures we 
restrain our analysis with the focus on these potentially most reliable measures, RD and RAD. These 
measures are robust to variations in the number of market periods, the determination of the FV and 
dividend distribution/variation. 
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Table 6: Markets Exhibiting Bubble Patterns 
Market 
State 
Label 
Bubble  
in Periods 
Converged  
in Period 
10 TinB- 11-15 -- 
22 Nin- 7-13 14 
23 Nin+ 10-11 12 
29 Tin+ 11-12 13 
 
The applied average bias measure for a market calculates the relative deviation (RD) as 
the average difference between the market price (𝑃𝑡) and the fundamental value (𝐹𝑉𝑡) 
normalized by the average fundamental value (𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ). It measures the average relative 
distance between the market price and the fundamental value. A value of ±0.1 indicates 
that the assets are on average overvalued (undervalued) by 10% relative to the average 
fundamental value. 
 𝑅𝐷 =
1
15
∑ (
𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡
𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅
)
15
𝑡=1
 (2) 
   
The applied average dispersion measure for a market calculates the relative absolute 
deviation (RAD) as the average absolute difference between the market price (𝑃𝑡) and 
the fundamental value (𝐹𝑉𝑡) normalized by the average fundamental value (𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ). It 
measures the average absolute distance between the period market price and the 
fundamental value. A value of 0.1 indicates that the assets price differs on average by 
10% from the average fundamental value. 
 𝑅𝐴𝐷 =
1
15
∑ (
|𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡|
𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅
)
15
𝑡=1
 (3) 
   
Both measures are used to get a first impression of differences in price deviations from 
fundamentals between treatments. We conduct two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests with 
the null hypothesis of no difference for both deviation measures. Table 7 displays the 
results. RDs are not significantly different when compared by treatment, due to the fact 
that negative deviations in the “good” and positive deviations in the “bad” state cancel 
each other out. The comparison of RADs shows that the provision of BFVs is only 
conducive to market performance when no insiders are present. The presence of 
insiders enhances performance compared to the situation without insiders, however, 
only when no BFVs are given. The performance of markets where insiders are present 
and BFVs are given together is indistinguishable to markets where only one of these 
features is at work.  
To check the robustness of the results above and for a deeper understanding of potential 
factors that influence price formation and thus over- or undervaluation of equilibrium 
markets prices, we conduct panel-regressions with markets as cross sections (𝑚 =
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1, . . . , 32). The dependent variable is derived from the above mentioned RD measure 
(Stöckl et al. 2010), denoted in percent. It is defined as:  
 
𝑅𝐷𝑚𝑡 =
𝑃𝑚𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡
𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅
, (4) 
   
where 𝑅𝐷𝑚𝑡  measures the difference between the market price of period 𝑡 (𝑃𝑡) and the 
respective fundamental value (𝐹𝑉𝑡), normalized by the average fundamental value (𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
(Stöckl et al. 2010). The index 𝑚 denotes the market. 
We control for treatment effects by using dummy variables for different treatment 
features (considering Nin+ as the control group) and their interactions. In particular, we 
control for the “state of the world” (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, which is equal to one in the “bad” state and 
zero otherwise), for the provision of BFVs (𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑠, which is one when BFVs are given 
and zero otherwise), and for the presence of insiders (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠, which is equal to one, 
when insiders are present, and zero otherwise). Additionally, we control for 
autocorrelation by inclusion of the dependent variable with a lag of one period (L. RD), 
for a time trend within markets by inclusion of a period variable (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑), and for the 
trading volume (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒). Furthermore we included the drawn dividend in the prior 
period (𝐿.  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑) and the number of risk-averse traders within a market 
(# 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒) as explanatory variables. The results are shown in Table 8. 
Since both regression models shown in Table 8 display qualitatively the same results, we 
focus our analysis on Model 2. The model shows that price deviations are strongly path-
dependent; a price deviation in the previous round (𝐿.  𝑅𝐷) has a significantly positive 
effect on the current price deviation. Price deviations decrease over time as participants 
gain trading experience. 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 has a significantly negative effect on price deviation. 
The last dividend (𝐿.  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑) has a significantly positive (euphoriant price boosting) 
effect, the higher the dividend in the previous period the larger the price deviation in the 
current period. Trading activity as measured by 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 has no significant effect, just as 
the number of risk-averse traders within a market (# 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒).  
Turning to the effects of treatment features, we see that “bad”-state markets exhibit 
significantly larger price deviations then “good”-state markets, a non-surprising finding, 
consistent with the prior nonparametric analysis. 
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Table 7: Relative and Absolute Deviation Measures 
Comparison by Nin NinB p-value Tin TinB p-value 
Bayesa 
RD 0.058 0.074 .8336 0.015 0.018 .9164 
RAD 0.291 0.195 .0357 0.176 0.200 .5286 
        Nin Tin p-value NinB TinB p-value 
Insidera 
RD 0.058 0.015 .8336 0.074 0.018 .5286 
RAD 0.291 0.176 .0033 0.195 0.200 .7527 
 
Comparison by Nin+ Nin- p-value NinB+ NinB- p-value 
Stateb 
RD -0.202 0.319 .0209 -0.095 0.243 .0209 
RAD 0.242 0.339 .0209 0.124 0.265 .0433 
        Tin+ Tin- p-value TinB+ TinB- p-value 
Stateb 
RD -0.097 0.128 .0209 -0.113 0.148 .0433 
RAD 0.149 0.203 .1489 0.185 0.214 .7728 
        Nin+ NinB+ p-value Nin- NinB- p-value 
Bayesb 
RD -0.202 -0.095 .0833 0.319 0.243 .2482 
RAD 0.242 0.124 .0209 0.339 0.265 .2482 
        Tin+ TinB+ p-value Tin- TinB- p-value 
Bayesb 
RD -0.097 -0.113 .7728 0.128 0.148 .5637 
RAD 0.149 0.185 .3865 0.203 0.214 .7728 
        Nin+ Tin+ p-value Nin- Tin- p-value 
Insiderb 
RD -0.202 -0.097 .0833 0.319 0.128 .0209 
RAD 0.242 0.149 .0209 0.339 0.203 .0209 
        NinB+ TinB+ p-value NinB- TinB- p-value 
Insiderb 
RD -0.095 -0.113 .7728 0.243 0.148 .3865 
RAD 0.124 0.185 .2482 0.265 0.214 .3865 
Notes: Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided: a N = 16 (8/8), b N = 8 (4/4). 
 
The provision of BFVs has no effect in both states, when the utilized control variables 
are considered. This contradicts the nonparametric result. We do not expect that this 
lack of difference is caused by the fact that traders were actually able to calculate BFVs 
in the setting where they were not provided. But traders seem to be intuitively able to 
anticipate approximated BFVs. The presence of insiders is only significant, i.e., exerting a 
negative (price deviation decreasing) effect in “bad”-state markets,20 a finding that 
requires further analysis for a proper understanding. 
We are able to calculate the treatment effects (coefficients), given that treatments are 
comprised of combinations of several features. These coefficients are presented in Table 
9 in descending order in terms of the coefficient size. The calculated coefficients are 
equal to the ones that result out of a regression with treatments as dummy variables and 
Nin+ as baseline.   
                                                          
20 This outcome is, as explained later, driven by the fact that Nin+ and Tin+ markets are not statistically 
different. For NinB+ and TinB+ markets the presence of insiders is beneficial. 
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Table 8: Regressions for RDs of Market Prices from Fundamentals 
Dependent Variable: 𝑅𝐷𝑚𝑡 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Constant (Nin+) 6.30 -3.53 
 (5.01) (10.12) 
𝐿. 𝑅𝐷𝑚𝑡 0.56*** 0.57*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Period -1.15*** -1.20*** 
 (0.41) (0.57) 
Volume 0.13 0.10 
 (0.27) (0.26) 
State (Nin-) 22.30*** 25.38*** 
 (7.03) (8.22) 
Bayes (NinB+) -4.75 -2.68 
 (4.08) (4.87) 
Insiders (Tin+) 4.43 4.66 
 (4.87) (5.10) 
State×Bayes 6.56 3.12 
 (6.54) (9.12) 
State×Insiders -16.39** -17.29* 
 (7.93) (10.09) 
Bayes×Insiders 8.63 6.42 
 (6.53) (7.60) 
State×Bayes×Insiders -8.06 -3.05 
 (9.41) (12.98) 
L. Dividend  0.12*** 
  (0.04) 
# Risk Averse  0.92 
  (1.68) 
   
R² .7478 .7534 
N 247 247 
Notes: Prais-Winsten panel-regression with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors and 
panel-specific autocorrelation (AR1) (Beck and Katz 1995). 32 markets as cross sections with a 
maximum of 15 observations over time (unbalanced). Only periods where trade took place are 
considered. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Using these coefficients we are able to disentangle differences between treatments by 
conducting meaningful comparisons which consist of three comparisons for each 
treatment: (1) a comparison with the counterpart in the “bad”/”good” state, (2) a 
comparison with the counterpart where BFVs are/are not provided, and (3) a 
comparison with the counterpart where insiders are/are not present, respectively. We 
conduct Wald tests to test for the equality of estimated coefficients for these 
comparisons. The results can be retraced via Table 10, where all possible comparisons 
are shown and significant differences are highlighted as bold figures.   
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Table 9: Treatment Effects on RDs of Market Prices from Fundamentals in Model 2 
Treatment Effect of… Coefficient p-value 
NinB- S+B+SB 25.82 .000 
Nin- S 25.38 .002 
TinB- S+B+I+SB+SI+BI+SBI 16.56 .000 
Tin- S+I+SI 12.75 .004 
TinB+ B+I+BI 8.40 .062 
Tin+ I 4.66 .361 
Nin+ --- -3.53 .727 
NinB+ B -2.68 .582 
Notes: S = State (“Bad”), B = BFVs (provided), I = Insiders (present). 
 
Our finding that “bad” state markets exhibit significantly larger price deviations then 
“good”-state markets is confirmed with the exception of Tin markets, where deviations 
in the “bad” state are larger, however, statistically insignificant. The result that the 
provision of BFVs has no effect is unambiguously confirmed. Moreover, as already seen, 
the presence of insiders significantly reduces price deviations in “bad”-state markets, 
leading to an improved market performance. 
Furthermore, the presence of insiders leads to an increase of the deviation measure in 
the “good” state which, given that “good”-state markets tend to trade below 
fundamentals, leads to an improvement in market performance, i.e., deviations from FVs 
are smaller in absolute terms, when insiders are present; however, the difference 
between Nin+ and Tin+ is not significant. Thus, these findings confirm and broaden the 
prior findings of the nonparametric analysis. 
Result 2: Bubbles occur but are infrequent. The nonparametric analysis indicates that the 
introduction of insiders reduces bubbles, measured by RD and RAD, however, only when 
BFVs are not provided. The provision with BFVs significantly reduces deviations, however, 
only when no insiders are present. The performance of markets where insiders are present 
and BFVs are given together is not distinguishable from markets where only one of these 
ingredients is at work. The panel analysis refines and demerges the previous results and 
indicates that the introduction of insiders improves market performance (measured by 
𝑅𝐷𝑚𝑡) and that the provision of BFVs has no effect on market performance. 
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Table 10: Wald Test for Differences of Treatment Coefficients in Model 2 
 NinB+ NinB- TinB+ TinB- Nin+ Nin- Tin+ Tin- 
NinB+ --- .000 .018 .000 .582 .000 .103 .002 
NinB-  --- .001 .032 .000 .942 .000 .003 
TinB+   --- .077 .062 .027 .469 .364 
TinB-    --- .000 .175 .016 .379 
Nin+     --- .002 .361 .004 
Nin-      --- .005 .087 
Tin+       --- .134 
Tin-        --- 
Notes: p-values of Wald tests for the simple linear hypothesis of equality of estimated parameters are 
shown. Nin+ is the reference category. Bold figures show significant differences at the 10 % level. 
 
For the sake of completeness, Figure 3 presents the course of the average trading 
volumes conditioned on information and the provision of BFVs. Each curve represents 
the average over four markets, in the “good” or “bad” state, respectively. The trading 
volume shows a tendency to decline on average with market duration. Trading volumes 
do not to differ significantly between different treatment conditions. 
 
Figure 3: Average Trading Volume 
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4.3. Comparison of Insiders and Outsiders 
 
Following the investigation of overall trading patterns we now turn to the analysis of the 
trading behavior of in-and outsiders and explore Hypotheses 3 to 5. Figure 4 shows the 
course of average limit buy and sell order prices in the TinB and Tin markets.21 As can be 
seen, in- and outsider limit bids and limit asks differ but not substantially. Limit buy and 
sell order prices only differ clearly in the first period(s) of the TinB- and Tin+ markets. 
In these cases both prices are lower for insiders in the TinB- markets (in the case of limit 
sell order prices “irrationally” low) and higher in the Tin+ markets, respectively. 
Furthermore, the following general patterns are visible. Firstly, both trader types, on 
average, want to pay less when buying and ask higher prices when selling assets 
compared to the actual FV in the TinB+ and Tin+ markets. Secondly, both trader types, 
on average, want to pay approximately the FV to buy assets but ask more than the actual 
FV to sell assets in the TinB- and Tin- markets. 
Result 3: Trading behavior of uninformed traders at the beginning differs from that of 
informed traders but converges with the market price during the market toward that of 
informed traders. Uninformed traders are able to grasp the correct state and to trade 
accordingly to it. 
We continue our analysis with nonparametric statistical tests on first-period bid and ask 
behavior of in- and outsiders, measured by limit buy/sell order prices and quantities. 
First-period behavior of outsiders does not differ between the two states (using two-
sided U tests), whether BFVs are provided or not. In other words, the starting positions 
of outsider bid and ask prices and quantities are the same in the “good” and “bad” state. 
First-period behavior of insiders, on the contrary, differs significantly between the two 
states, with higher bid/ask prices in the “good” state, and also larger bid/ask quantities, 
when BFVs are not provided (see Table A. 5 in Appendix A). 
Comparing first-period behavior between in- and outsiders, we find outsider limit 
buy/sell order prices to be higher in TinB- markets and insider limit buy order prices 
and sale quantities to be higher in the Tin+ markets (using two-sided U tests). The 
differences in buy/sell order prices and quantities in TinB+ and Tin- markets are 
insignificant (see also Table A. 5 in Appendix A). 
To identify overall differences in the buying and selling behavior of in-and outsiders, we 
conduct panel-regressions with traders as cross sections (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 192). The dependent 
variable used is again derived from the RD measure (Stöckl et al. 2010), denoted in 
percent, and is defined as: 
 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐷,𝑆 =
𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝐷,𝑆 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡
𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅
, (5) 
   
                                                          
21 Figures A. 1 and A. 2 in Appendix A additionally exhibit the average limit buy and sell prices of the 
Nin(B) and Tin(B) markets, whereby for the latter prices are averaged over both in- and outsiders. 
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where 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐷,𝑆 measures the difference between the individual limit buy/sell order prices 
of period t (𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝐷,𝑆) and the respective fundamental value (𝐹𝑉𝑡), normalized by the average 
fundamental value (𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ). 
We control for trader type effects by using dummy variables for the trader types under 
all treatment conditions (resulting in Nin+ Outsider as the reference type). Additionally, 
we control for autocorrelation by inclusion of the dependent variable with a lag of one 
period (𝐿.  𝑅𝐷), for a time trend within markets by inclusion of a period variable 
(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑), for the bid/ask quantity (𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦), for the amount of assets held in 
the portfolio (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠), and for the trading activity in the previous period 
(𝐿.  𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, 𝐿.  𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠). Furthermore, we include the drawn dividend of the 
prior period (𝐿.  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑), a variable that measures the individually perceived 
understanding of the market (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔, elicited in the ex-post 
questionnaire, ranging from 0 to 10), a variable that measures individual risk aversion 
(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) (elicited following the approach of Holt and Laury (2002), ranging from 
-3 to 5), and 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 (with women as reference category) as explanatory variables. The 
results are shown in Table 11. Given the similar results for each of both dependent 
variables, we focus our analysis respectively on the augmented Models 4 and 6. 
The regression results for Model 4 show that bid price deviations (measured by 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝐷) 
are path-dependent; 𝐿. 𝑅𝐷 has a significantly positive effect. Traders bid more eagerly in 
later periods; 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 has a significantly positive effect on bid prices. Traders are 
cautious when buying, the higher the bid quantity, the lower the bidding price; 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝐷) has a significantly negative effect. Current asset holdings (in the 
portfolio) and the quantity of sold assets in the prior period do not have an influence; 
Asset Holdings and 𝐿.  𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 are insignificant. Previous buying success, however, 
reduces bid prices; 𝐿.  𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 has a significantly negative effect. The dividend 
drawn in the previous period has a slight price boosting effect, the higher the dividend in 
the previous period the larger the bid price in the current period; 𝐿. 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 is 
significantly positive. Individual 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 have 
significantly negative effects on bid prices. Male traders bid higher prices compared to 
women; 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 is significantly positive. 
Comparing the bid prices of in- and outsiders, we see that on average insiders bid higher 
prices in the Tin+ and TinB+ markets and lower prices in the Tin- and TinB- markets. All 
differences are significant, except for TinB- (see Table 12). 
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Figure 4: Insider and Outsider Limit Buy Order and Limit Sell Order Prices 
 
The regression results for Model 6 show that ask prices (measured by 𝑅𝐷𝑡
𝑝𝑆) are 
strongly path-dependent (more path-dependent than bid prices); 𝐿.  𝑅𝐷 has a 
significantly positive effect. Traders are satisfied with lower ask prices in later periods; 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 has a significantly negative effect. Traders seem not to be as cautious with regard 
to their portfolio when selling; 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑆 ) and current 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 do not 
to have a significant effect. On the other hand, previous buying success reduces ask 
prices, 𝐿.  𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 is significantly negative, and previous sale success increases 
bid prices, 𝐿.  𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 is significantly positive. The dividend drawn in the previous 
period again has a slight price boosting effect on the ask price in the current period; 
𝐿.  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 is significantly positive. Individual 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, 
and 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 have no significant effects on ask prices. 
Looking at the comparison of ask prices between in- and outsiders we see that on 
average insiders ask higher prices in the Tin+, TinB+, and TinB- markets and lower 
prices in the Tin- markets. However, the differences are only significant for Tin+ and 
Tin- markets (see Table 12). 
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Table 11: Regressions for RDs of Limit Buy and Sell Prices from Fundamentals 
Dependent Variable: 
Model 3 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝐷
 
Model 4 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝐷
 
Model 5 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑆
 
Model 6 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑆
 
     
Constant (Nin+ Outsider) -18.53*** -5.78 7.47** 23.40*** 
 (6.23) (10.14) (3.06) (7.64) 
L. 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝐷,𝑆
 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Period 0.65* 0.62* -0.72*** -0.72*** 
 (0.34) (0.33) (0.24) (0.24) 
Order Quantity (𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝐷 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑆 ) -0.63*** -0.73*** -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.23) (0.22) 
Asset Holdings -0.14 -0.25 -0.12 0.01 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.23) (0.20) 
L. Bought Assets -2.17*** -2.17*** -1.20*** -1.08*** 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.39) (0.38) 
L. Sold Assets -0.13 -0.18 2.36*** 2.55*** 
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.46) 
Nin- Outsider 41.83*** 43.75*** 25.94*** 26.12*** 
 (7.08) (7.18) (4.52) (4.31) 
NinB+ Outsider 9.68** 10.12** -0.17 0.09 
 (3.90) (4.05) (2.76) (3.09) 
NinB- Outsider 37.68*** 38.47*** 25.18*** 24.84*** 
 (6.84) (6.94) (4.42) (4.55) 
Tin+ Insider 4.63 10.77** 1.61 5.04 
 (4.59) (5.13) (2.77) (3.21) 
Tin+ Outsider 3.29 1.14 -0.49 -3.38 
 (3.91) (4.13) (2.93) (3.21) 
Tin- Insider 14.36*** 13.15*** 5.77 0.82 
 (4.68) (4.89) (4.39) (4.82) 
Tin- Outsider 20.65*** 21.88*** 9.63*** 9.25*** 
 (5.06) (5.40) (3.42) (3.59) 
TinB+ Insider 9.31* 10.35** 1.46 0.66 
 (4.91) (5.13) (2.82) (3.06) 
TinB+ Outsider 0.53 -2.92 0.33 -1.83 
 (4.04) (4.83) (2.85) (2.86) 
TinB- Insider 24.66*** 22.87*** 17.44*** 15.62*** 
 (7.95) (8.16) (4.48) (4.81) 
TinB- Outsider 26.44*** 25.60*** 10.91** 9.62* 
 (5.79) (5.80) (5.31) (5.40) 
L. Dividend  0.05*  0.07** 
  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Market Understanding  -2.98**  -3.69 
  (1.29)  (1.13) 
Risk Aversion  -1.57***  -0.34 
  (0.51)  (0.53) 
Gender (Male)  8.16***  0.05 
  (2.45)  (1.99) 
     
R² .3961 .4131 .6099 .6170 
N 1597 1597 1742 1742 
Notes: Prais-Winsten panel-regression with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors and 
panel-specific autocorrelation (AR1) (Beck and Katz 1995). 192 traders as cross sections with a 
maximum of 15 observations over time (unbalanced). ). Only cases where buy/sell offers were made 
are considered. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12: Wald Tests for Differences of Treatment Coefficients in Models 4 & 6 
 Insider vs. Outsider 
Treatment 
(State Label) 
p̅D 
(4) 
p̅S 
(6) 
Tin+ .0291 (>) .0280 (>) 
   
Tin- .0459 (<) .0704 (<) 
   
TinB+ .0080 (>) .4158 
   
TinB- .7135 .3083 
Notes: p-values of Wald tests for the simple linear hypothesis of 
equality of estimated parameters are shown. 
 
Aggregating the results for limit bid/ask prices we conclude that, particularly in the 
beginning of the markets, insiders are the traders which tend to buy assets in the “good” 
state, when assets are relatively cheaply sold by outsiders and sell assets in the “bad” 
state, when they are relatively expensively bought by outsiders. Given this conclusion it 
is not surprising that asset holdings of in- and outsiders indeed differ significantly 
between “good”-state and “bad”-state markets, at least in the beginning of the markets, 
as it is theoretically predicted by both informational models (PI and RE). 
In the “good”-state markets, insiders are those traders that hold on average more assets 
during the entire markets and significantly more during the first six periods. In the 
“bad”-state markets outsiders are those traders that hold on average more assets during 
the entire markets and significantly more during periods 3 to 13. All differences are 
significant at the 5-10% level, using the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank test, N = 16 
(8/8). Insiders are thus capable of using their superior informational position and buy 
relatively underpriced assets in the “good” state and sell relatively overpriced assets in 
the “bad” state. However, it should be noted that asset stocks of in- and outsiders align 
during the course of the markets in both states. 
Result 4: Insiders are those traders that hold more assets in the “good”-state markets and 
outsiders are those traders that hold more assets in the “bad”-state markets. 
Furthermore a concentration of assets at single players over the course of the markets is 
evident. Over all markets the trader with the largest asset portfolio in one market holds 
on average 27.2 assets (with a standard deviation of 6.298) at the end of period 15. 
Concentration, however, is not automatically equated with a more remunerative trading 
strategy of the “hoarding” traders. Although, in eleven markets those traders which held 
the largest asset stock also earned the highest net-profit (total profit minus prediction 
earnings), a significant correlation cannot be detected between the asset stock of a 
trader at the end of a market and her/his net-profit. The Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient is 𝜌 = .0263 (p-value = .7174).  
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Although the behavior of in- and outsiders converges, insiders are able to benefit from 
their superior informational position. Insiders on average earn higher total profits in 
Tin+, Tin-, TinB+, and TinB- markets, though the difference to outsiders is only 
significant for Tin+ (see Table A. 6 in Appendix A). Aggregated over all treatments with 
informational asymmetry, insiders earn significantly higher total profits (6346 ECU vs. 
5565 ECU, two-sided t-test, p-value = .0793, N = 96, 32/64). 
Result 5: Informed traders have a trading advantage that is revealed in superior profits. 
Summarized our data definitively indicates that traders in Tin(B) markets didn’t incur 
what Camerer et al. (1989) call the “curse of knowledge”. 
Markets are not strong-form efficient, following the definition of Fama (1970), because 
insiders are able to earn “abnormal returns” from trading on the basis of their private 
(insider) information. This result supports the findings of Jaffe (1974). 
 
4.4. Beliefs and Market Prices 
 
Since optimal trading actions depend on beliefs about other players’ decisions, which 
again depend on the beliefs of actions of others etc. (Palfrey and Wang 2009),22 we 
examine if stated beliefs on the market price are informative about the actual market 
price. We investigate to what extent elicited price expectations and actual market prices 
are correlated. Furthermore, we are interested in how expectations change if the 
available information and distribution of information changes. 
We are aware that belief elicitation can alter decisions in the experiment. Gächter and 
Renner (2010) for example have shown that incentivized belief elicitation about 
contributions of others leads to higher contributions in a public-good experiment. 
However, the experimental asset markets investigated by Haruvy et al. (2007), who 
elicited beliefs about market prices in the same way as we do, closely resemble markets 
of previous studies without belief elicitation. Thus, we do not expect a large 
manipulation. 
In the beginning of each period, participants were required to state their expectations 
about the prospective market prices of the present and all subsequent trading periods. 
In the following we denote the elicited beliefs in the form: 𝐵𝑡
𝑓, where 𝑡 denotes the 
period of elicitation, i.e., the period in which traders were asked to submit their price 
beliefs and 𝑓 denotes the period forecasted, i.e., the period for which the price beliefs are 
stated. 
Figure 5 shows the average predicted price levels by treatment. Each bar in all eight 
graphs represents the average of four markets, i.e., 24 traders. Figure A. 3 in the 
                                                          
22 “In a world of uncertainty “fundamentals” get replaced by expectations about fundamentals” (Sunder 
1995, p. 468). 
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appendix illustrates the associated between-subject standard deviations of the market-
price predictions. As can be seen, traders’ expectations about the price trajectory 
contain the belief of declining prices as theoretically prescribed by fundamentals. This 
indicates that fundamentals are clearly interpreted as the expected value of the future 
dividend stream, as emphasized in the experimental instructions. In contrast to (Lei et 
al. 2001), in our framework, a common dividend, and common knowledge thereof, 
seems to be sufficient to induce initial common expectations that are consistent with 
fundamentals. In contrast, traders in Haruvy et al. (2007) anticipated a flat price 
trajectory at the beginning, followed by an increasing trajectory in the middle, and a 
declining trajectory toward the end of the first round of their experiment. Our findings 
resemble their markets with most experienced traders.23 
Individual beliefs for the first period (𝐵1
1) start under almost all conditions around the 
BFV in the 1st period, which is 563. A t-test for the null hypothesis of no difference shows 
only for Tin a significant difference, where the average is 465.7 (p-value = .0036, N = 48), 
compared to 547.4, 528.6, and 552.9 for NinB, TinB, and Nin respectively. Price 
assessments do not differ significantly by state within equal treatment conditions.  
Within the insider treatments with and without the provision of BFVs we find that 
insider 𝐵1
1 are respectively significantly higher for the “good” state compared to the 
“bad” state (U tests, N = 16: 587.9 vs. 296.6, p-value = .0098; 596.5 vs. 488.8, p-
value = .0712). Outsider beliefs on the other hand are, as we would expect, not 
significantly different between both states (U tests, N = 32: 548.2 vs. 595.4, p-
value = .4677; 431.4 vs. 423.1, p-value = .7773), though clearly different with and 
without the provision of BFVs. 
Applying our convergence measure defined in Section 4.1 on the average last belief for 
each period (?̅?𝑡
𝑡
), we find that beliefs converge more slowly toward fundamentals than 
market prices. We find 21 out of three markets not to converge, compared to ten 
markets for prices. Convergence time is slower for all treatments, though the difference 
is only significant for Tin (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = .0487). This result is 
consistent with the findings of Haruvy et al. (2007) when traders had some experience. 
Comparing the RD and RAD measures for last beliefs (𝐵𝑡
𝑡) and market prices we find that 
RD shows only a significant difference between beliefs and market prices in NinB, where 
it is larger for prices, while the RAD measure is significantly larger for beliefs in NinB, 
TinB, and Tin markets (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, respective p-values: .0687, .0251, and 
.0357). It seems that positive and negative deviations cancel out each other in RD for 
both, beliefs and prices, but that deviations are absolutely larger for beliefs as revealed 
by RAD. Markets seem to exert a kind of synergy effect on traders’ beliefs that help 
prices to converge faster to the rational expectations equilibrium than beliefs. To further 
test whether better market-price predictions in a market, measured by the average total 
prediction earnings in a market, lead to lower price deviations from fundamentals, 
measured by RD and RAD, we use a Spearman correlation test. We find a negative, 
                                                          
23 Participants in Haruvy et al. (2007) played four markets, consisting of 15 periods each, in a row. 
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however insignificant relation for RD (𝜌 = -.1850, p-value = .3108), but a significantly 
negative correlation for RAD (𝜌 = -.3082, p-value = .0862). Better predictions thus seem 
to lower price deviations. 
Since the most important characteristic of forecasts or predictions is their correctness 
we now turn to the ability of forecasts to make inferences about future prices. To 
estimate the informational content contained in predictions of traders, we first estimate 
if and how the price level and the average belief about the market price are “correlated”, 
using the following model: 
 𝑃𝑚𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽?̅?𝑚𝑡
𝑡
+ 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜖𝑡, (6) 
   
where 𝑃𝑡 is the market price in period t, ?̅?𝑡
𝑡
 is the average stated belief for the market 
price of period 𝑡 in period 𝑡. 𝑋 is a vector of further explanatory variables, containing 
treatment dummies, a period variable (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑), and the drawn dividend in the prior 
period (𝐿.  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑). If short-term expectations of market prices are unbiased, then 𝛼 =
0, 𝛽 = 1, and 𝛾 = 0 are the expected coefficients. 
Furthermore, to test the correctness of average trader beliefs concerning the 
anticipation of the market price, we estimate the following model: 
 ?̅?𝑚𝑡
𝑡
− 𝑃𝑚𝑡
𝑃𝑚𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 (
?̅?𝑚𝑡−1
𝑡−1
− 𝑃𝑚𝑡−1
𝑃𝑚𝑡−1
) + 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜖𝑡, (7) 
   
where (?̅?𝑡
𝑡
− 𝑃𝑡) 𝑃𝑡⁄  denotes the deviation of the average belief in a market from the 
market price, relative to the market price.  (?̅?𝑡−1
𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑡−1) 𝑃𝑡−1⁄  is simply the one-period 
lag of the dependent variable and X is defined as above. If short-term expectations are 
unbiased, i.e., correct, then 𝛼 = 0, 𝛽 = 0, and 𝛾 = 0 are the expected coefficients. 
The regression results of both models are shown in Models 7 and 8 in Table 13. As can 
be seen from Model 7 price expectations and actual market prices are strongly 
“correlated” with a highly significant coefficient of 0.9, which is however significantly 
different from one (𝛽 ≠ 1, p-value = .0011). Model 8 shows that the forecast quality, i.e., 
the relative deviation of beliefs from market prices, is not auto-correlated since 𝛽 is not 
statistically different from zero. Moreover, as it seems, the presence of insiders rather 
impedes forecast precision than enhances it. The three largest (negative) deviations in 
absolute terms, which hint on an underestimation of market prices, are all attributed to 
treatments where insiders were present (TinB+, Tin+, and Tin-). 
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Figure 5: Average Predicted Market Prices 
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This finding seems to be driven by the outsiders in the Tin(B) markets and is supported 
by the following: On aggregate over all treatments with informational asymmetry, we 
find a significant difference in prediction earnings between in- and outsiders (144.9 ECU 
vs. 115.3 ECU, two-sided t-test, p-value = .0735, N = 96, 32/64).24 Prediction earnings of 
outsiders in the Nin(B) markets are, however, not significantly different from earnings 
of insiders in the Tin(B) markets, but also significantly larger than prediction earnings of 
outsiders in the Tin(B) markets (137.0 ECU vs. 115.3 ECU, two-sided t-test, p-
value = .0562, N = 160, 96/64). The presence of insiders thus seems to psychologically 
impede the prediction ability of outsiders in the Tin(B) markets. This finding is 
consistent with Lovaglia et al. (1998), who found that a randomly assigned lower status 
impedes performance in a test of mental ability. 
Given that the maximum possible amount for prediction earnings is 600 ECU, if all 
predictions lie in a range of ±10% of the market price, prediction earnings of both 
trader types are quite bad and quite close to another, with a mean of 125.2 ECU, a 
standard deviation of 76.3 ECU, and a minimum and maximum of 0 ECU and 396 ECU 
over all 192 traders, respectively. Thus no pertinent differences can be found in a 
regression of market prices on individual beliefs. Nevertheless, although the difference 
is not large, it indicates that the trading advantage of insiders is at least partially 
conveyed in a better ability to anticipate market prices. 
Result 6: Elicited price expectations and actual market prices are highly correlated. 
However, forecast quality (precision of beliefs) seems rather to be impeded by the presence 
of insiders. The provision of BFVs seems to have no impact on forecast quality. 
To test whether better predictors also earn higher total trading profits (total profits 
corrected for prediction earnings) we use a Spearman correlation test. Over all 196 
traders we find a highly significant connection between individual prediction quality 
and trading profits (𝜌 = .2717, p-value = .0001). As we would expect, better predictors 
have more success in the market. 
Additionally, we found men to make significantly higher earnings for predictions 
compared to women (139.5 vs. 118.5, two-sided t-test, p-value = .0432, N = 192, 
113/79) and higher total trading profits, though here the difference is not significant 
(5800 vs. 5559, two-sided t-test, p-value = .4362, N = 192, 113/79). Alike, master 
students make significantly higher earnings for predictions compared to Bachelor 
students (151.4 vs. 124.9, two-sided t-test, p-value = .0319, N = 181, 42/139) and also 
earn higher total trading profits (6372 vs. 5430, two-sided t-test, p-value = .0106, 
N = 181, 42/139).  
                                                          
24 When Tin+, Tin-, TinB+, and TinB- markets are considered separately (see Table A. 6 in Appendix A), we 
find insiders to be slightly better predictors and earn on average higher prediction earnings, however the 
difference to outsiders is not significant. 
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Table 13: Belief Regressions 
Dependent Variable 
Model 7 Model 8 
𝑃𝑚𝑡  (?̅?𝑚𝑡
𝑡
− 𝑃𝑚𝑡)/ 𝑃𝑚𝑡 
   
Constant (Nin+) 21.59 3.08 
 (15.35) (5.60) 
?̅?𝑚𝑡
𝑡   0.90***  
 (0.03)  
(?̅?𝑚𝑡−1
𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑚𝑡−1)/𝑃𝑚𝑡−1  -0.02 
  (0.05) 
Period  0.56 
  (0.36) 
L. Dividend 0.29** -0.04 
 (0.13) (0.04) 
NinB+ 52.77*** -3.82 
 (17.91) (4.76) 
NinB- 47.04** -9.22* 
 (19.04) (5.12) 
TinB+ 40.51** -12.88** 
 (19.45) (5.53) 
TinB- 3.21 -2.09 
 (13.43) (5.13) 
Nin- 12.47 -9.65* 
 (17.45) (5.21) 
Tin+ 71.08*** -22.26*** 
 (18.89) (5.56) 
Tin- -7.62 -10.34* 
 (13.08) (6.12) 
   
R² .8746 .1450 
N 315 247 
Notes: Prais-Winsten panel-regression with heteroskedastic panels corrected 
standard errors and panel-specific autocorrelation (AR1) (Beck and Katz 1995). 
32 markets as cross sections with a maximum of 15 observations over time 
(unbalanced). Only periods where trade took place are considered. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Our study investigates price formation in a multi-period asset market with uncertainty 
about market fundamentals. This novel framework combines the SSW environment with 
a “state-environment” investigated by, for example, Camerer and Weigelt (1991). It 
represents a “more realistic” market, although we are aware that real-life markets are 
not only characterized by uncertainty but also by ambiguity. In this newly designed 
uncertain SSW environment, we investigate whether (1) the existence of traders who 
are informed about the true state and/or (2) the provision of Bayesian updates of the 
assets’ state-dependent fundamental values lead to better market performance. 
Our results differ from earlier studies in that we hardly find any bubbles under all 
treatment conditions, even though all subjects were inexperienced. Out of 32 markets 
only four reveal a bubble pattern. Our explanation is that possibly the two possible 
states exert a psychologically restraining effect on market prices and force participants 
to more carefully reflect on their trading decisions. 
We find markets with asymmetrically informed traders to exhibit smaller price 
deviations from fundamentals, implying higher market efficiency. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Sutter et al. (2012), and is most likely attributed to the 
fact that uninformed traders act in a more prudent way to bypass exploitation, when 
they are aware of the fact that some traders have an advantage (of whatever kind). 
The provision of BFVs has seemingly little to no effect. The mere assistance in the 
assessment of the state seems not to be sufficient to improve market performance. 
Concerning the trading behavior of in- and outsiders, we find that it differs at the 
beginning but converges during the course of the markets, indicating that that state 
information is revealed over time. In accordance with the predictions of the PI- and RE-
models, we further find outsider limit buy/sell prices on average to be lower (higher) in 
the “good” (“bad”) state compared to the limit buy/sell prices of insiders. As a result, 
outsiders on average hold less (more) assets in “good”-state (“bad”-state) markets. Thus, 
informed traders are able to earn superior profits. Depending on the state, they buy 
cheaply from or sell expensively to outsiders and thus capitalize their superior position. 
With regard to elicited price expectations, we find forecasts and actual market prices to 
be highly correlated. The precision of forecasts, however, seems to be impeded by the 
presence of insiders while the provision of BFVs seems to have no impact on forecast 
quality. 
We observe that the presence of insiders increases market efficiency. However, we have 
to be very cautious with this interpretation. We are not inclined to state that 
informational asymmetries are per se beneficial for market performance. In our 
experiment, the existence of insiders increases the information in the market. Increasing 
the level of information even more, we have conducted an additional experiment, in 
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which we employed a standard SSW framework with a single state. Dividends again 
could take values of 10 ECU, 20 ECU, 40 ECU, or 80 ECU, however, with equal and fix 
probabilities of 25 percent, respectively. Traders did not face any uncertainty about the 
state, and were in a sense all insiders. These markets, again, hardly showed any 
bubbles.25 Additionally they exhibited with -0.078 a smaller average RD than all our 
other treatments with two possible states (accounted for the state) and with 0.180 also 
the smallest average RAD.26 
Obviously, the more precise statement should be that increased information in a market 
tends to lead to more market efficiency. With regard to insiders we have to be aware of 
the fact that informational asymmetries in markets with insiders are not beneficial in all 
aspects. The higher market efficiency in our markets, where insiders were present and 
could trade on their information, is based on the expense of outsiders. Given the 
differences in the trading behavior, particularly in the beginning of the markets, insiders 
on average manage to shift their asset holdings to the detriment of outsiders. In 
addition, the presence of insiders seems to confuse outsiders given their significantly 
inferior market price forecast capability. Taken together, it is likely that deprived market 
participants in such trading environments would lose faith and trust in the securities’ 
markets and possibly withdraw all or part of their capital, rendering the market less 
liquid. 
Hence, to maintain the confidence in the fairness of financial markets, we rather support 
the position of proponents of insider trading regulation, requesting traders and other 
market agents possessing material nonpublic information to make reasonable efforts to 
achieve public dissemination of the relevant information on the broadest possible basis 
(CFA Institute Code of Ethics & Standards of Professional Conduct CFA Institute 2010). 
We advocate all types of rules which are targeted towards faster and broader 
dissemination of information. 
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25 The general lack of bubbles might, besides the general difference of the structure of fundamentals, 
might be caused by the relatively small number of traders in our markets. This might decrease the 
incentives to speculate, in particular in combination with the call-auction trading mechanism, which tends 
to lead to a lower trading volume than continuous double-auction markets. However, Sutter et al. (2012) 
observed bubbles with the same number of traders per market and Haruvy et al. (2007) observed bubbles 
by using a call auction. 
26 Figure B. 1 in Appendix B shows the trajectory of individual market prices and Figure B. 2 the trajectory 
of the average price in this experiment. 
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Appendix A 
Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Attitudes Toward Risk 
Table A. 1: Risk-Test 1 
Decision 
# 
Lottery A Lottery B 
Expected 
Payoff 
Difference 
Risk Attitude 
(# safe 
choices) 
1 1/10 of 50 , 9/10 of 40  1/10 of 96 , 9/10 of 2  29.6  -3 
2 2/10 of 50 , 8/10 of 40  2/10 of 96 , 8/10 of 2  21.2  -2 
3 3/10 of 50 , 7/10 of 40  3/10 of 96 , 7/10 of 2  12.8  -1 
4 4/10 of 50 , 6/10 of 40  4/10 of 96 , 6/10 of 2  4.4  0 
5 5/10 of 50 , 5/10 of 40  5/10 of 96 , 5/10 of 2  -4.0  1 
6 6/10 of 50 , 4/10 of 40  6/10 of 96 , 4/10 of 2  -12.4  2 
7 7/10 of 50 , 3/10 of 40  7/10 of 96 , 3/10 of 2  -20.8  3 
8 8/10 of 50 , 2/10 of 40  8/10 of 96 , 2/10 of 2  -29.2  4 
9 9/10 of 50 , 1/10 of 40  9/10 of 96 , 1/10 of 2  -37.6  5 
10 1 of 50 , 0 of 40  1 of 96 , 0 of 2  -46.0  5 
Notes: All payoffs are in ECUs. Lottery A is considered as the “safe” choice and Lottery B as the “risky” 
choice. -5 = extremely risk-loving, -4 = highly risk-loving, -3 = very risk-loving, -2 = risk-loving, -1 = slightly 
risk-loving, 0 = risk-neutral, 1 = slightly risk-averse, 2 risk-averse, 3 = very risk-averse, 4 = highly risk-
averse, 5 = stay in bed. 
Market/subject mean = 1.750, market maximum (minimum) = 3.000 (0.500), subject maximum 
(minimum) = 5 (-3). Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the average risk attitude in one 
market and the market price in the 1st period: -0.0979, p-value = 0.5942 (negative relationship expected). 
 
Table A. 2: Risk-Test 2a 
Decision 
No. 
Lottery A Safe Payoff 
Expected 
Payoff 
Difference 
Risk 
Attitude 
(# safe 
choices) 
1 
Lottery A: 
4/10 of 80 , 
3/10 of 40 , 
2/10 of 20 , 
1/10 of 10. 
20  29 -5 
2 25  24 -4 
3 30  19 -3 
4 35  14 -2 
5 40  9 -1 
6 45  4 0 
7 50  -1 1 
8 55  -6 2 
9 60  -11 3 
10 65  -16 4 
Notes: All payoffs are in ECUs. -5 = extremely risk-loving, -4 = highly risk-loving, -3 = 
very risk-loving, -2 = risk-loving, -1 = slightly risk-loving, 0 = risk-neutral, 1 = slightly 
risk-averse, 2 risk-averse, 3 = very risk-averse, 4 = highly risk-averse, 5 = stay in bed. 
Market/subject mean = -0.813, market maximum (minimum) = 0.167 (-2.167), subject 
maximum (minimum) = 4 (-5). Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the 
average risk attitude in one market and the market price in the 1st period: -0.0369, p-
value = 0.8412 (negative relationship expected). 
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Table A. 3: Risk-Test 2b 
Decision 
# 
Lottery A Safe Payoff 
Expected 
Payoff 
Difference 
Risk 
Attitude 
(# safe 
choices) 
1 
Lottery A: 
1/10 of 80 , 
2/10 of 40 , 
3/10 of 20 , 
4/10 of 10. 
5  21 -4 
2 10  16 -3 
3 15  11 -2 
4 20  6 -1 
5 25  1 0 
6 30  -4 1 
7 35  -9 2 
8 40  -14 3 
9 45  -19 4 
10 50  -24 5 
Notes: All payoffs are in ECUs. -5 = extremely risk-loving, -4 = highly risk-loving, -3 = 
very risk-loving, -2 = risk-loving, -1 = slightly risk-loving, 0 = risk-neutral, 1 = slightly 
risk-averse, 2 risk-averse,    3 = very risk-averse, 4 = highly risk-averse, 5 = stay in bed. 
Market/subject mean = 0.427, market maximum (minimum) = 1.500 (-1.167), subject 
maximum (minimum) = 5 (-4). Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the 
average risk attitude in one market and the market price in the 1st period: 0.1205, p-
value = 0.5111 (negative relationship expected). 
 
 
Table A. 4: Ex-post Questionnaire Question - Attitude toward Risk 
Question: Are you generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid risks? 
  
Highly 
risk-
averse 
(0) 
---- --- -- - 
 
 
 
(5) 
+ ++ +++ ++++ 
Highly 
risk-
loving 
(10) 
           
Notes: Market/subject mean = 4.646, market maximum (minimum) = 6.667 (2.667), subject maximum 
(minimum) = 10 (0). Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the average risk attitude in one 
market and the market price in the 1st period: 0.0956, p-value = 0.6029 (positive relationship expected). 
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Trading Behavior of Insiders and Outsiders 
 
Table A. 5: First Period Comparisons of Insiders and Outsiders 
 Insider w/ Bayes (1st Per.) Insider w/o Bayes (1st Per.) 
 + - p-valuea + - p-valuea 
pD 338.9 147.4 .0397 524.3 340.0 .0235 
pS 609.8 301.0 .0541 761.0 607.5 .0279 
qD 12.6 13.5 .7116 12.4 5.3 .0262 
qS 4.4 6.2 .2245 8.6 4.4 .0626 
        Outsider w/ Bayes (1st Per.) Outsider w/o Bayes (1st Per.) 
 + - p-valueb + - p-valueb 
pD 361.6 446.4 .1257 290.7 355.7 .3250 
pS 581.8 609.5 .6807 517.1 602.8 .6921 
qD 10.7 10.6 .9293 13.3 8.8 .4297 
qS 5.0 6.6 .2744 6.1 5.6 .6287 
        w/ Bayes+ (1st Per.) w/ Bayes- (1st Per.) 
 Insider Outsider p-valuec Insider Outsider p-valuec 
pD 338.9 361.6 .6968 147.4 446.4 .0013 
pS 609.8 581.8 .6100 301.0 609.5 .0386 
qD 12.6 10.7 .7947 13.5 10.6 .8083 
qS 4.4 5.0 .6733 6.2 6.6 .9159 
        w/o Bayes+ (1st Per.) w/o Bayes- (1st Per.) 
 Insider Outsider p-valuec Insider Outsider p-valuec 
pD 524.3 290.7 .0180 340.0 355.7 .7830 
pS 761.0 517.1 .1896 607.5 602.8 .3560 
qD 12.4 13.3 .5238 5.3 8.8 .4484 
qS 8.6 6.1 .0871 4.4 5.6 .4296 
Notes: Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided: a N = 16 (8/8), b N = 32 (16/16), c N = 24 (8/16). 
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Table A. 6: Profit and Prediction Earnings of Insiders and Outsiders 
 Insider+ Insider- 
 
w/ 
Bayes 
w/o 
Bayes 
p-value 
w/ 
Bayes 
w/o 
Bayes 
p-value 
Profita 7568 8962 .0929 4369 4483 .6744 
Pred. Earningsa 133.1 172.9 .0460 137.3 136.3 .4005 
        Outsider+ Outsider- 
 
w/ 
Bayes 
w/o 
Bayes 
p-value 
w/ 
Bayes 
w/o 
Bayes 
p-value 
Profitb 7183 6527 .2582 4315 4235 .6242 
Pred. Earningsb 100.3 121.5 .4397 131.3 108.2 .5216 
        w/ Bayes+ w/ Bayes- 
 Insider Outsider p-value Insider Outsider p-value 
Profitc 7568 7183 .3913 4369 4315 .9025 
Pred. Earningsc 133.1 100.3 .3272 137.3 131.3 .8303 
        w/o Bayes+ w/o Bayes- 
 Insider Outsider p-value Insider Outsider p-value 
Profitc 8962 6527 .0059 4483 4235 .3913 
Pred. Earningsc 172.9 121.5 .1500 136.3 108.2 .2439 
Notes: Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided: a N =16 (8/8), b N = 32 (16/16), c N = 24 (8/16). 
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Limit Buy and Sell Prices 
 
Figure A. 1: Average Limit Buy Order Prices 
 
 
Figure A. 2: Average Limit Sell Order Prices 
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Beliefs 
 
Figure A. 3: Standard Deviations of Predicted Market Prices 
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Appendix B 
Results of Additional Experiments with Known Fundamentals  
(SSW Framework) 
 
Figure B. 1: Individual Market Prices in the SSW Framework 
 
 
Figure B. 2: Average Market Price in the SSW Framework 
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Appendix C 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS (RISK TESTS) 
 
Welcome! You participate in an experiment that consists of two parts. In Part I of the 
experiment, you first take part in a decision experiment in which you can earn money. How 
much you earn depends, in Part I, only on your personal decisions. In Part II, your earnings will 
also depend on the choices of others. Each participant makes its decisions in isolation from the 
others on her/his computer. We ask you not to talk to other participants. 
PART I 
Part I of the experiment consists of three tasks. In Task 1 you have to make 10 decisions, first. In 
each you must choose between two options, lottery X or lottery Y. Each lottery involves two 
payments, for which there are different probabilities of occurrence, in each case. The payoffs are 
given in a fictitious currency ECU (experimental currency units). At the end of Part I, the 
computer will select among your 10 decisions randomly one, for which you are paid according to 
your selected option. The resulting ECUs are converted according to a fixed exchange rate in €. 
In Task 2A and 2B, you have to make 10 decisions each, choosing between a lottery and a safe 
payment (in ECU). At the end of Part I, the computer will select from among these choices 
randomly one, each, for which you are paid in € according to your selected option, taking into 
account the exchange rate. 
AVAILABLE INFORMATION 
A calculator is available at the right side of each decision screen which you can open via a small 
calculator icon. Once you have made your decisions in all three tasks, you will receive your 
results on the screen including your payment in € for Part I of the experiment.  
PAYMENT 
Your proceeds (in ECU) from the three tasks of Part I are converted into €, whereat each ECU is 
worth €0.005. You will also receive a compensation for your appearance. The payout is 
conducted individually and anonymously at the end of the experiment. 
In order to start the experiment, you need to click on the <Next> button. After completion of Part 
I, we ask you to stay at your place in the cabin and wait for further instructions for Part II of the 
experiment. 
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS (TINB) 
In Part II, the main part of the experiment, you will participate in a market experiment in which 
you can still earn money. How much you earn depends, in this part, on your decisions and, unlike 
Part I, also on the decisions of other participants. Each participant makes its decisions in 
isolation from the others on her/his computer. We ask you not to talk to other participants. 
PART II 
You now participate in a market which runs 15 trading periods. At the beginning you will be 
randomly matched with five other persons to build a group of six, in which you remain 
throughout the 15 trading periods. You will not know the identity of your group members at any 
time, though. 
In this part, you assume the role of a trader on a stock market, for assets of a single type. On this 
market, you have the opportunity to submit a buy and / or a sell offer in each of the 15 trading 
periods. However, you are not obliged to. 
At the beginning of the 15 periods, each group member is endowed with 10 assets and an initial 
trading capital of 10,000 ECU. This initial trading capital has to be repaid at the end of the 
experiment in full, again! 
THE VALUE OF AN ASSET 
Each asset has a lifespan of 15 trading periods. The so-called fundamental value of an asset is 
determined in each of the 15 periods as the sum of the, for all assets identical, dividends to be 
accrued in the future. After the last dividend payment at the end of the last period the asset is 
worthless. The dividend for an asset is randomly determined in each period by the computer 
and can take a value of 10 ECU, 20 ECU, 40 ECU or 80 ECU. 
There are two possible "states" with respect to the asset, State 1 ("good" state) and State 2 
("bad" state). Each state has the same probability of 50%. Given these probabilities, the 
computer randomly selects one of the two states before the first trading period. This state (State 
1 or State 2) withstands for the total market duration of 15 trading periods. 
Two randomly selected participants per group of six participants, whose identity remains secret, 
will be informed at the beginning of the market which state has actually been chosen and applies 
to all participants during the entire duration of the market. The other participants receive no 
information about the actually chosen state. The randomly drawn state determines the 
probabilities with which each of the possible values of the dividends of 10 GE, 20 GE, 40 GE or 80 
GE are drawn. These probabilities and the expected dividend of one asset are presented in Table 
1 for the two states. 
Since, in the two states, the probabilities of the possible dividend values and thus the expected 
dividend per period of an asset are different, also the fundamentals of an asset will develop in 
different ways over the course of the market. Table 2 shows the computation of the fundamental 
values in the periods 1 to 15 for the two possible states. 
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Table 1 
 State 1 (“good”) 
[50%] 
State 2 (“bad”) 
[50%] 
Possible Dividends 
[Probabilities] 
10 ECU [10%] 10 ECU [40%] 
20 ECU [20%] 20 ECU [30%] 
40 ECU [30%] 40 ECU [20%] 
80 ECU [40%] 80 ECU [10%] 
Expected Dividend  
of an Asset per Period 
49 ECU 26 ECU 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 Fundamental Values (in ECU) 
Period 
State 1 
(“good”) 
[50%] 
Cond. 
Prob. for 
State 1 
State 2 
(“bad”) 
[50%] 
Cond. 
Prob. for 
State 1 
Expected Value 
according to Bayes 
1 735 (=15×49) 0.5 390 (=15×26) 0.5 
562.5 
(=0.5×735+0.5×390) 
2 686 (=14×49) p1,2 364 (=14×26) p2,2 p1,2×686+p2,2×364 
3 637 (=13×49) p1,3 338 (=13×26) p2,3 p1,3×637+p2,3×338 
4 588 (=12×49) p1,4 312 (=12×26) p2,4 p1,4×588+p2,4×312 
5 539 (=11×49) p1,5 286 (=11×26) p2,5 p1,5×539+p2,5×286 
6 490 (=10×49) p1,6 260 (=10×26) p2,6 p1,6×490+p2,6×260 
7 441 (=9×49) p1,7 234 (=9×26) p2,7 p1,7×441+p2,7×234 
8 392 (=8×49) p1,8 208 (=8×26) p2,8 p1,8×392+p2,8×208 
9 343 (=7×49) p1,9 182 (=7×26) p2,9 p1,9×343+p2,8×182 
10 294 (=6×49) p1,10 156 (=6×26) p2,10 p1,10×294+p2,10×156 
11 245 (=5×49) p1,11 130 (=5×26) p2,11 p1,11×245+p2,11×130 
12 196 (=4×49) p1,12 104 (=4×26) p2,12 p1,12×196+p2,12×104 
13 147 (=3×49) p1,13 78 (=3×26) p2,13 p1,13×147+p2,13×78 
14 98 (=2×49) p1,14 52 (=2×26) p2,14 p1,14×98+p2,14×52 
15 49 (=1×49) p1,15 26 (=1×26) p2,15 p1,15×49+p2,15×26 
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Since, in the game, you are not necessarily informed about which state has actually been drawn, 
you may only know the initial probability of 50% for each state, you are provided at the 
beginning of each period with recalculated probabilities for the two states according to the so-
called Bayesian method. These so-called conditional probabilities for the states take into account 
the, up to that time, randomly drawn dividends. Because the conditional probabilities cannot be 
specified in advance, they are denoted in Table 2 with 𝑝𝑖,𝑗. Thereby, 𝑖 𝜖 {1, 2} denotes the state 
and 𝑗 𝜖 {2, … , 15} denotes the period. In addition to the recalculated conditional probabilities 
you are provided, at the beginning of each period, with a fundamental value which is adapted to 
these conditional probabilities (fundamental value according to Bayes) on your screen. 
DECISIONS 
Before you can submit your buy and sell offers for the assets in each trading period, you are 
asked to forecast the resulting asset price in the market for all future periods. This market price 
is determined and announced to you at the end of each period. In particular, you enter in each 
period 𝑡 𝜖 {1 , . . . , 15 } a total of (16 − 𝑡) forecasts for the future periods. Because you can rethink 
your forecasts in each period, you have to submit for each period 𝑡 a total of 𝑡 forecasts in the 
course of the market. Depending on the forecast accuracy of your forecasts you receive a 
payment (in ECU) after each period which was predicted. Table 3 gives an overview of the 
payments depending on the quality of forecasts. These payments can be received for each period 
𝑡 a maximum of 𝑡 times. With the <Tabulator> button you can switch the entry fields for your 
decisions. All entries are completed by clicking on the <Submit Forecasts!> button. 
 
Tabelle 3: 
Accuracy of the Forecast 
Payment for each Correct 
Forecast 
Within ± 10% of the actual market price 5 ECU 
Within ± 10-20% of the actual market price 2 ECU 
Within ± 20-30% of the actual market price 1 ECU 
 
Trading in each period takes place as follows. Each trading period lasts a maximum of 240 
seconds. In the first 120 seconds, you first have the opportunity to submit an offer to buy by 
entering a "limit buy price" and the corresponding "limit buy quantity" in the appropriate fields 
on the screen. 
The limit buy price is the price you are willing to pay at most per asset. This means you buy at 
this or any lower price which is established on the market. Please enter in addition to your limit 
buy price your corresponding limit purchase quantity of assets you want to buy at a price lower 
than or equal to your limit buy price. If only a smaller amount of assets is available on the 
market for you, you get this smaller amount. In extreme cases, it is also possible that you get no 
assets. If you do not want to buy at any price but want just to keep your asset inventory, leave 
the entry fields empty. 
Please confirm your entries by clicking on the button <Confirm Buying Decision!>. Subsequently 
you switch to the screen for the submission of your selling offer.   
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In the second 120 seconds you have then the opportunity to submit an offer to sell, by entering a 
“limit sell price” and the corresponding “limit sell quantity” in the appropriate fields on the 
screen. 
The limit sell price is the price you want to have at least per asset. This means you sell at this or 
any higher price which is established on the market. Please enter in addition to your limit sell 
price your corresponding limit sell quantity of assets you want to sell at a price higher than or 
equal to your limit sell price. If there is only a lower demand for your assets on the market, you 
sell this smaller amount. In extreme cases, it is also possible that you sell no assets. If you do not 
want to sell at any price but want just to keep your asset inventory, leave the entry fields empty. 
Please confirm your entries by clicking on the button <Confirm Selling Decision!>. When all 
participants have completed their decision to sell, the experiment continues. All buy and all sell 
offers aggregated, respectively. Out of this, the market price and the corresponding trading 
volume (the total quantity traded) are determined. All individual transactions that are possible 
under these conditions are conducted. If no transactions can take place, there is no market price. 
In this case, we denote the market price with 0. 
Transactions take place as long as there are dealers who want to sell at a lower or the same price 
than dealers are willing to pay. For the determination of the market price and trading volume all 
bids are aggregated, from the highest to the lowest bid, into a falling demand curve in price, and 
all selling offers are aggregated, from the lowest to the highest selling offer, into an increasing 
supply curve in price. The intersection of these two curves determines the (maximum possible) 
trading volume. The market price is determined as the average of the smallest limit buy price 
and the highest limit sell price for which a transaction just comes about. 
Please note that your inventory of assets and trading capital changes through trade after each 
period. The selling of assets reduces the asset and increases the trading capital inventory. The 
buying of assets increases the asset and reduces the trading capital inventory. In addition, the 
dividend income, of the assets held by you at the end of each period, increases the trading 
capital. 
When choosing your buying and selling offers, you must ensure that they are permissible. If you 
trade, you firstly can never sell more assets than you have in your own asset inventory in this 
period, secondly never buy more assets, as is permitted by the available sum of the asset 
holdings of the other market participants in your group and thirdly never buy more assets at a 
certain price, as is permitted by your trading capital in this period. Fourthly, you must note that 
your limit sell price, at which you wish to sell assets, must be higher than your limit buy price, at 
which you wish to buy assets. Possible prices that may be entered are all integer numbers 
between 1 and 1500, as long as none of the rules above is violated. If you make an entry that 
violates these rules, this will be automatically indicated on the screen and you have to revise 
your input. However in this case, you also have the opportunity to continue without entering an 
offer by leaving the entry fields empty. 
Should you have not verified your buying and/or selling decision during the respective 120 
seconds, the (possibly) until then entered decisions are not taken into account, i.e., you would 
not buy or sell anything in the respective decision stage!   
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AVAILABLE INFORMATION 
A calculator is available at the right side of each decision screen, which you can open via a small 
calculator icon. Additionally, you are provided in each period, in all decision stages, with all 
relevant information via a summary table on the screen. Just click on the button <Show Results 
of Previous Periods> which is located in the middle at the bottom of the screen. To return from 
this summary screen back into the respective decision stage, you have to click on the button 
<Back to…>, respectively. Furthermore, an overview of the results of the just completed period 
is displayed after each period on the screen. 
PAYMENT 
Your relevant income for the payout (in ECU) in Part II of the experiment is determined by your 
trading capital at the end of the last period minus the initial trading capital. The relevant income 
for the payout is calculated alternatively as the sum of your individual period profits. The period 
profit is calculated as follows: 
Period profit = Your asset holdings at the end of the period × Dividend per Asset 
   in this period (= dividend income) 
  + Proceeds from the disposal of assets in this period 
  – Expenditures for purchased assets in this period 
  + Remuneration for the forecast(s) of the market price in this period 
 
Your relevant income for the payout (in ECU) from Part II is converted into €, whereat each ECU 
is worth €0.003. In addition, you will receive your payout from Part I and a show-up fee of €3. If 
your trading capital at the end of the last period of part II is not sufficient for the repayment of 
the initial trading capital, your relevant income for the payout in Part II is negative. This negative 
payment is deducted from your payout from Part I and your show-up fee. However, you cannot 
suffer a real loss, i.e., your minimum payout is zero. The payout is conducted individually and 
anonymously at the end of the experiment. 
We ask you now to go to the computer with your participation number. There you have to click 
on <Continue>. You then will be given on your screen a number of questions regarding these 
instructions. If you have any questions please address yourself to the experimenter. Only when 
all participants have correctly answered all questions, the experiment starts. 
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Screenshots 
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